Grenada : The Birth and Death of a Revolution (Dialogue #34) by Boodhoo, Ken I.
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
LACC Occasional papers series. Dialogues (1980 -
1994) LACC Publications Network
5-1-1984
Grenada : The Birth and Death of a Revolution
(Dialogue #34)
Ken I. Boodhoo
Florida International University, Department of International Relations
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/laccopsd
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the LACC Publications Network at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LACC Occasional papers series. Dialogues (1980 - 1994) by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boodhoo, Ken I., "Grenada : The Birth and Death of a Revolution (Dialogue #34)" (1984). LACC Occasional papers series. Dialogues
(1980 - 1994). Paper 36.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/laccopsd/36
G ~ N A D A :  THE BIRTH AND 
DEATH O F  A REWOLUTION 
D r .  Ken I. Boodhoo 
Dialogue $34 
May, 1984 
PREFACE 
Ken I, Boodhoo is  Associate  Professor  of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Relat ions a t  F lo r ida  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Universi ty .  A s tudent  
of Caribbean a f f a i r s  and a  n a t i v e  of Trinidad,  D r ,  Boodhoo 
has r ecen t ly  conducted research  throughout t h e  Eas tern  
Caribbean and is  preparing a  book-length work on t h e  Grenadan 
Revolution and i t s  d e s t r u c t i o n  by t h e  events  of October, 1983. 
The e s s e n t i a l  o u t l i n e s  of t h i s  work were f i r s t  presented t o  
s tuden t s  and f a c u l t y  i n  a  colloquium a t  F lo r ida  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Universi ty  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  U,S.-led invasion of Grenada. 
Comments o r  i n q u i r i e s  about t h e  paper a r e  welcomed and should 
be addressed t o  t h e  author  a t  t h e  Department of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Relat ions.  Publ ica t ion  of t h i s  work has been made poss ib le  
i n  p a r t  by a  g r a n t  from t h e  F lo r ida  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  U n i v e ~ s i t y  
Foundation, Inc. 
Mark B, Rosenberg 
Direc tor  
The Gairy Years 
U n t i l  t h e  coup s t aged  by t h e  New Jewel Movement on 
March 13,  1979 t h e  modern h i s t o r y  of Grenada w a s  dominated by 
t h e  f i g u r e  of E r i c  Matthew Gairy ,  a t  t h a t  t i m e  Prime Min i s t e r  
and l e a d e r  of t h e  Grenada United Labor P a r t y  (GULP) ,  t h e  
governing p a r t y  i n  t h e  e l e c t e d  l e g i s l a t u r e .  
Born i n  1922, E r i c  Gairy  a t  age twenty had,  l i k e  many of 
h i s  countrymen, migra ted  t o  neighboring Tr in idad  t o  seek employ- 
ment i n  t h e  o i l f i e l d s  t h e r e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  he followed a pa th  
e a r l i e r  e s t a b l i s h e d  by h i s  f e l l o w  Grenadian,  Tuba1 Uriah B u t l e r ,  
one of  t h e  foremost  r a d i c a l  l e a d e r s  of t h e  c o l o n i a l  Caribbean 
b lack  masses. L a t e r ,  Gairy  went t o  t h e  Dutch colony of Aruba, 
a l s o  working i n  t h e  o i l  i n d u s t r y ,  and f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  became 
involved i n  t r a d e  union a c t i v i t i e s .  When he  r e t u r n e d  t o  Grenada 
i n  1949 he  u t i l i z e d  h i s  now developed t r a d e  union o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
s k i l l s ,  ve ry  r a p i d l y  developing a mass o r g a n i z a t i o n  of over  
20,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l  and r e l a t e d  workers.  
By t h e  e a r l y  1950 's  t h e  Grenadian c o l o n i a l  economy was a 
c l a s s i c  example of a sma l l - s ca l e  p l a n t a t i o n  type  economic system. 
The economy, based on smal l -s ized p l a n t a t i o n s  of cocoa,  nutmegs 
and suga r ,  w a s  owned by t h e  very  sma l l ,  l i gh t - sk inned  e l i t e  
group. The peasan t ry  eked o u t  a l i v i n g  on t h e i r  small p l o t s  of 
l and  o r  on seasona l  employment o f f e r e d  by t h e  expor t -or ien ted  
p l a n t a t i o n s .  And u n t i l  t h e  a r r i v a l  of  Gairy employment i n  
a g r i c u l t u r e ,  a s  w a s  t h e  case throughout t h e  r eg ion ,  o f f e r e d  
extremely low wages. With a p e r  c a p i t a  income a t  about  $250, 
unemployment and under-employment caused serious hardships 
for the Grenadian majority. 
The politico-constitutional counterpart of this colonial 
economic system was that of a Crown Colony government in which 
power resided in the hands of the British Governor assisted 
by his civil servants. And indeed until the granting of 
universal adult suffrage in 1951 the majority of the Grenadian 
population did not participate in the political process. 
During the first quarter of 1951, Grenada experienced 
the most widespread and violent strikes the country had expe- 
rienced until that time, called by Gairyfs Trade Union in 
support of increased wages in the sugar industry. These 
strikes culminated in the largest working class demonstration 
the country witnessed. The British, unfortunately for them, 
played into Gairyts hands by sending him to jail. As the 
demonstrations grew for his release, the British governor 
was forced to negotiate directly with Gairy in order to return 
peace to the colony. Gairy at once gained the legitimacy he 
had earnestly sought. The Governor eventually conceded Gairy 
as the leader of the country's working class. 
Gairy and his GULP won the 1951 elections but quickly 
realized the major constraints placed on his power as a con- 
sequence of the colonial constitution. While he had obtained 
some degree of authority, ultimately, final decision-making 
resided with the British Governor. In the 1954 elections 
Gairyts GULP won 6 of the 8 seats, albeit with reduced voter 
suppor t ,  and i n  1957 he  l o s t  c o n t r o l  of t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  by 
winning on ly  2  seats. The p a r t y  was r e tu rned  t o  o f f i c e  i n  t h e  
1961 e l e c t i o n s  bu t  f i n a n c i a l  mismanagement and charges  of 
c o r r u p t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  suspension of t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and a  
c a l l  f o r  new e l e c t i o n s  t h e  fo l lowing  y e a r .  I n  t h i s  e l e c t i o n  
t h e  GULP l o s t  t o  t h e  middle c l a s s ,  bus ines s  o r i e n t e d ,  Grenada 
Nat iona l  P a r t y  which went on t o  run  t h e  count ry  u n t i l  1967. 
One major reason  f o r  G a i r y l s  d e f e a t  i n  1962 was undoubtedly 
t h e  i s s u e  of u n i t a r y  s t a t u s  o f  Grenada wi th  T r in idad ,  fol lowing 
t h e  demise of t h e  West I n d i e s  Federa t ion .  This  s t a t u s  was 
opposed by t h e  GULP. Add i t i ona l ly ,  by 1960, Grenada had begun 
t o  exper ience  g radua l  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of  i t s  eoonomy t o  which 
Gairy had no t  t aken  account .  The r i s e  of t h e  h o t e l  i n d u s t r y ,  
and wi th  it inc reased  employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  w a s  a t  t h e  expense of  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  i n  
t h e  q g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r .  The l a t t e r  w a s  t h e  base  of G a i r y ' s  
suppor t .  While t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  workforce had dropped from 
12,432 i n  1946 t o  8,660 i n  1970, employment i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
i n d u s t r y  had inc reased  from 2,900 t o  4 , 2 0 0  between 1960 and 
1970. Ove ra l l  wh i l e  employnent i n  t h e  urban i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  
had inc reased  by 62 p e r  c e n t  i n  t h e  decade of t h e  ' 6 0 ' s  employ- 
ment i n  t h e  r u r a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  had dec l ined  by 30 pe r  
c e n t  dur ing  t h a t  pe r iod .  1 
Gairy had always counted h e a v i l y  on suppor t  from t h e  
r u r a l  popula t ion .  S ince  some of t h e s e  people  were now s a l a r i e d  
urban workers t h e i r  c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s  were thereby  a l t e r e d .  
However, after five years of GNP leadership, the elections of 
1967 once again returned Gairy to office with an ammended 
constitution permitting him more latitude to manipulate his 
authority. Gairy's new title was 'Premiert as Grenada became 
an Associated State in free association with Britain. In 
general, this new relationship meant that Grenada, led by 
Gairy, controlled its internal welfare, with Britain respon- 
sible for defense and external relations, 
By 1967 Eric Gairy had emerged as an extremely contro- 
versial figure who generated strong feelings, both for and 
against his leadership. His appeal was based on a curious 
admixture of a charismatic-type personality; a ski1.lful mani- 
pulation of religious symbols including his involvement in 
voodoo-type worship; and ultimately as well, the emergence of 
the "Moongoose gang." This latter group comprised largely of 
thugs, roughly akin to the Tonton Macoute of Haiti, emerged 
during the 1967 elections and were not disbanded until the 
NJM coup twelve years later. 
Gairy's cavalier attitude toward leadership an8 adminis- 
tration of state affairs contributed, during thEs period to 
his ultimate downfall. This administration was characterized 
by personal corruption, financial mismangement and inefficiency, 
and the emergence of arrogant and somewhat dictatorial 
leadership. There was little discernible government planning 
and programs. While the land reform program permitted the 
government to acquire twenty-six estates, very little of this 
was redistributed to the poor and landless. Moreover, the 
ever present threat pravided by Gairy's Moongoose gang did 
not contribute to open participation in the democratic 
process. It was this climate of fear and intimidation of 
the increasingly economically depressed masses that provided 
the setting for the New Jewel Movement. 
The Rise of the NJM 
During late 1960's the English Caribbean was hit by a 
wave of turmoil and civil unrest, that to one degree or 
another, affected every island. Tt was the legacy of the 
Bootstrap philosophy with its dependent capitalist approach 
to development introducing inappropriate technologies 
exacerbating the unemployment situation and class divisions. 
Simultaneously free university education provided the dis- 
possessed with opportunities hitherto reserved to the elites. 
Major explosions were experienced in Jamaica in 1968 and in 
Trinidad in 1970. This was the era of the rise of the Black 
Power ideology, which built on the thought developed by the 
New World Group a decade earlier. In the smaller islands of 
the English-speaking Caribbean, the Forum group was established 
in St. Lucia, Yulimo in St, Vincent, the Antigua Caribbean 
Liberation Movement, the Movement for a New Dominica and the 
New Jewel Movement in Grenada. 
What eventually became known as the NJM actually had its 
beginnings with the return of Unison Whiteman, a young economist, 
to Grenada, in 1964. Disturbed by the conditions 
working class he organized a small discussion group confined 
largely to the strongly agricultural parish of St. David. 
In 1972, this group was formalized as the Joint Endeavor for 
Welfare, Education and Liberation - "Jewel." 
After legal training and involvement in the West Indian 
minority politics in England, Maurice Bishop, the son of a 
middle-class St. George's businessman, returned to Grenada 
in 1969. Immediately he became involved in domestic politics, 
protesting with, and Later successfully defending, a group of 
nurses who took to the streets to dramatize the deplorable 
conditions at the government hospitals. In 1972, at Bishop's 
initiative, the Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP) 
was formed. The MAP opposed the existing Westminster model 
of government as non-functional to the needs of the society, 
and suggested a radical alternative--the establishment of 
Peoples Assemblies. The latter was viewed as a practical 
method for permitting the broader mass of the society to have 
more meaningful input into the state's decision-making process. 
Initially, Bishop's economic philosophy was strongly influenced 
by the ideas developed by Julius Nyerere. 
By the early 19701s, therefore, power in Grenada, was 
firmly in the hands of Eric Gairy with some popular support 
from therural areas, but reinforced by the Moongoose group. 
Formal opposition in 
class in orientation. 
the legislature 
Nevertheless, 
was minimal and middle 
arising in the rural area, 
conf ron t ing  G a i r y ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  power base ,  w a s  Whiteman's 
J e w e l  group,  and i n  S t .  George's  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  c a p i t a l ,  was 
Bishop 's  MAP. While a t  t h a t  t i m e  s e p a r a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
bo th  t he  Jewel and t h e  MAP were t h e  f i r s t  groups t o  o f f e r  
p roposa l s  f o r  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  r a t h e r  t han  modifying t h e  e x i s t i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic systems.  And t o  t h a t  e x t e n t  it w a s  
a lmost  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  they  would come t o  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  
Gairy . 
An i n c i d e n t  i n  l a te  1972 pushed t h e  s y n t h e s i s  of t he  Jewel 
and t h e  MAP. I n  t h e  p a r i s h  of S t .  David, t h e  base  f o r  Jewel 
g rouptan  Engl i sh  e s t a t e  owner, wi th  G a i r y ' s  a s s i s t a n c e ,  had 
purchased land  c u t t i n g  o f f  acces s  t o  a  l o c a l  beach. The l o c a l  
p r o t e s t e r s  c a l l e d  on t h e  J e w e l  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e ,  and defy ing  
t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  s e n t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  estate,  t o r e  down f ences  
r ega in ing  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  beach. Within two months, i n  March 
1973, t h e  MAP and Jewel combined t o  form t h e  New J e w e l  Movement. 
W i t h t h e  former having focused on p o l i t i c a l  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  and 
t h e  l a t t e r  on a g r i c u l t u r a l  development, f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime 
w a s  Gairy faced  w i t h  a  broadly based o r g a n i z a t i o n  wi th  mass 
appeal  and a  coheren t  program. 
By t h i s  t ime E r i c  Gairy  himself  had sought t o  o rgan ize  
a g a i n s t  any broadly-based oppos i t i on  group. H e  had e a r l i e r  
gained l e g i s l a t i v e  approva l  f o r  an  Emergency Powers Act 
s t r eng then ing  p o l i c e  powexs and r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  movement and 
assembly of people .  To f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  s e c u r i t y  f o r c e s  
he boasted:  
" W e  are now doubl ing t h e  s t r e n g t h  of our  P o l i c e  
Force ,  w e  a r e  g e t t i n g  i n  a lmost  un lhn i t ed  s u p p l i e s  
of new and modern equipment ... ( t h e )  Opposi t ion 
r e f e r r e d  t o  my r e c r u i t i n g  c r i m i n a l s  i n  a  r e s e r v e  
f o r c e .  To  t h i s  I s h a l l  n o t  say yea o r  nay. Does 
it n o t  t a k e  s teel  t o  c u t  s t e e l ?  ... Indeed, hundreds 
have come and some of t h e  t oughes t  and roughest  
roughnecks have been r e c r u i t e d . .  ."* 
Confronta t ion  between t h e  N J M  and G a i r y ' s  government 
w a s  s w i f t ,  and i n  most c a s e s ,  v i o l e n t .  I n  l a t e  1973 when t h e  
N J M  was engaged i n  a  b r i e f  a l l i a n c e  wi th  t h e  G N P  o rgan iz ing  
a series of s t r i k e s ,  Gairy  responded w i t h  s ta te  f o r c e  involv ing  
p h y s i c a l  abuse of t h e  oppos i t i on ,  t h e  j a i l i n g  of i t s  l e a d e r s h i p ,  
and e v e n t u a l l y ,  dea th  t o  a  few N J M  sympathizers .  The even t s  
of "Bloody Sunday" became a foremost  example of s t a t e  v io l ence  
a g a i n s t  t h e  oppos i t i on ;  and e v e n t u a l l y ,  t h e  t u r n i n g  p o i n t  of 
oppos i t i on  a g a i n s t  Gairy .  U n t i l  t h a t  t i m e  t h e  primary opposi-  
t i o n  group was t h e  N J M .  A f t e r  t h e  even t s  of t h a t  day,  when 
t h e  e n t i r e  l e a d e r s h i p  of  t h e  N J M  was savagely  bea t en ,  t o r t u r e d ,  
and imprisoned by G a i r y ' s  Moongoose gang, oppos i t i on  became 
broadly based , inc lud ing  themidd le  and upper c l a s s e s ,  i n  revul -  
s i o n  a g a i n s t  Gairy-led b r u t a l i t y .  
From Independence t o  N J M  coup 
Many have argued t h a t  t h e  pe r iod  between Independence 
i n  February 1974 t o  March 13 ,  1979, t h e  d a t e  of t h e  coup, 
Grenada, under Gairy ,  exper ienced t h e  elements of an emerging 
f a s c i s t  s t a t e ,  which the reby  made t h e  coup almost  i n e v i t a b l e .  
Technica l ly ,  t h e  par l i ament  of t h e  now independent 
country was the seat of decision-making, Between 1974 and 
December 1976, Gairy's party controlled 14 of the 15 seats 
in parliament. The lone opposition member was rarely in 
attendance. During the second phase from December 1976 until 
the coup in March 1979 there was a strong opposition party 
since the government now controlled 9 of the 15 seats. 
However, during both periods the Parliament was a mere 
"rubber stamp for the government decisions that had already 
been made elsewhere. "3  And moreover, because of 'Gairy ' s  
decision style ...q uestions in Cabinet were not always re- 
solved by debate and majority resolutions (since) Cabinet 
members merely echoed the views of the Prime Minister. 114 
It is also interesting to note that during the entire dura- 
tion of the second independence parliament--a period of 
twenty-seven months, the Parliament met for a total of 
eighteen days even though the constitution demanded more 
frequent meetings. It is clear, therefore, that while the 
formal structure of democratic institutions and processes 
existed, in practice decision-making over the five year 
period became increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
Prime Minister Gairy. 
The events of "Bloody Sunday" heralded a new level of 
violence by the Gairy governments against opposition forces. 
Among opposition activists killed was Rupert Bishop, father 
of Maurice, while attempting to protect a group of women who 
were engaged in a demonstration against the governnent, 
This  murder se rved  f u r t h e r  t o  c o a l e s c e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  Gairy 
culminat ing i n  an A l l i a n c e  between t h e  N J M ,  t h e  GNP and t h e  
United Peop le ' s  Pa r ty .  I t  was t h i s  A l l i a n c e  t h a t  won s i x  
of t h e  f i f t e e n  par l imentary  s e a t s  i n  1976 and 4 8  p e r  c e n t  
of t h e  popular  vo t e .  I n  t h a t  e l e c t i o n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  wide- 
spread charges  w e r e  brought  a g a i n s t  t h e  government concerning 
e l e c t o r a l  f r a u d .  
Concerned a s  he  w a s  w i th  t h e  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of pe r sona l  
power and wea l th ,  Gairy  permi t ted  t h e  Grenadian economy t o  
degenera te  du r ing  t h e  post-independence pe r iod .  The b a s i c  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  s t e a d i l y  d e t e r i o r a t e d .  The road system w a s  
i n  d i s r e p a i r .  The medical  system w a s  i l l -equ ipped  and under- 
s t a f f e d .  The educa t iona l  system, a t  a l l  l e v e l s ,  was neg lec ted .  
However, t h e  s t a t e  system of r ep re s s ion :  policemen, pa id  
a u x i l i a r i e s ,  s o l d i e r s ,  t h e  s e c r e t  p o l i c e  and p o l i c e  s t a t i o n s ,  
a l l  expanded s t e a d i l y .  I t  w a s  l a r g e l y  a s  a  consequence of 
t h e  l a t t e r  t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  f i s c a l  d e f i c i t  problem exacerba ted .  
And t o  compensate f o r  t h e  d e f i c i t ,  t a x e s  were d rama t i ca l ly  
i nc reased .  By t h e  l a t e  1970 ' s  t a x e s  accounted f o r  27  p e r  c e n t  
of G D P ,  wi thout  t h e  d e f i c i t  s i t u a t i o n  being a l l e v i a t e d .  This  
was one of t h e  major reasons  why t h e  b a s i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  of 
t h e  s o c i e t y  d e t e r i o r a t e d .  
The Gairy government d i d  embark on a  " land  reform" program. 
Under t h i s  program he purchased mid-sized e s t a t e s  e i t h e r  from 
t h o s e  e lements  of t h e  p l an toc racy  opposed t o  him, o r  from h i s  
f r i e n d s ,  t h e  l a t t e r ,  a t  i n f l a t e d  p r i c e s ,  and r e t u r n e d  it, i n  
A 
smaller parcels, in some cases, to his supporters. Many of 
these estates, though, were maintained under state control 
which later passed on to the Bishop government. 
As a consequence of the physical deterioration of the 
society, and increased repression by the state, Gairy's 
government became increasingly isolated from its regional 
partners in the Caribbean Economic Community. At this point, 
Gairy turned to develop linkages with regimes akin to his in 
South Korea, Chile and Somoza's Nicaragua. The 1977 military 
agreement with Pinochet of Chile which called for the training 
of Grenadians in Chile, and arms transfers, clearly indicated 
the future course of the Grenadian government. 
It was against the background of Gairyism: the concen- 
tration of power and accumulation of wealth in the hands of 
one individual; the tactics of repression increasingly 
resembling that of the right-wing Chilean regime, including 
five political assassinations; and the impending economic 
collapse of the state, did the NJM stage its pre-dawn coup on 
March 13, 1979. The NJM later claimed that the final decision 
on the coup was influenced by their belief that the Gairy 
regime was about to assassinate the entire NJM leadership. 
This claim was widely believed by Grenadians at that time. 
The Consolidation of the Revolution 
Within a few hours of the seizure of power the leader of the 
People's Revolution Government (PRG), Maurice Bishop, explained 
< 
t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  a r a d i o  b roadcas t ,  
"People of  Grenada, t h i s  r e v o l u t i o n  i s  f o r  
work, f o r  food,  f o r  decen t  housing and 
h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s ,  and f o r  a b r i g h t  f u t u r e  
f o r  ou r  c h i l d r e n  and g r e a t  g randchi ld ren .  
The b e n e f i t s  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  w i l l  b e  
g iven  t o  everyone r e g a r d l e s s  of p o l i t i c a l  
op in ion  o r  which p o l i t i c a l  g a r t y  t hey  suppor t .  
Le t  us  a l l  u n i t e  a s  one. . ."  
Thus d i d  Bishop o u t l i n e  t h e  broad g o a l s  of h i s  government w i t h  
t h e  emphasis upon s o c i a l  and economic change f o r  t h e  Grenadian 
masses. But t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  s ta te  t h a t  t h e  PRG d i d  n o t  have 
p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  w e l l .  
P o l i t i c a l  Objec t ives :  
A fundamental o b j e c t i v e  of  Bishop 's  o r i g i n a l  MAP was t o  
move Grenada away from t h e  i n h e r i t e d  Westminster-type p a r l i a -  
mentary system, t o  t h e  i nnova t ive ,  Assemblies of t h e  People.  
The twenty-f ive  yea r  r u l e  of  E r i c  Gairy had demonstrated 
t h a t  whi le  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  f a u l t  w i th  t h e  
B r i t i s h - t y p e  system of government, i n  p r a c t i c e ,  par l i amentary  
democracy, i n  Grenada, was de  f a c t o  r ep l aced  by one man r u l e .  I n  
s p i t e  of t h i s ,  t h e  formal t r a p p i n g s  of t h e  Westminster system: 
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  par l i ament  and t h e  oppos i t i on  w e r e  a l l  fo rmal ly  
mainta ined.  
Developing t h e  i d e a s  of t h e  MAP, t h e  1973 N J M  Manifes to  
dl had dismissed t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  system as " f i v e  second 
democracy," t h a t  i s ,  t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  c a s t  an  e l e c t o r a l  b a l l o t  
once every  f i v e  y e a r s .  I n  i t s  p l a c e  t h e  N J M  had proposed a  
system of direct democracy through assemblies of the people. 
These assemblies, as orginally proposed, would be organized 
at the local village level, the parish and at the national 
level. At the latter level, a National Assembly would replace 
the former parliament. Representatives to the National 
Assembly were expected to be elected by the local assemblies. 
In practice, the PRG established a system of parish 
and zonal councils which assumed some of the consultative 
functions previously undertaken by a state parliament. Immedia- 
tely after the takeover of government the PRG suspended the 
constitution and established a governing committee of Ministers, 
which ruled through the issuance of People's Laws. While 
majority membership of the ruling committee were the leaders 
of the NJM--nine among a total of fourteen members--an alliance 
was formed with some representatives of the business community 
and the former middle-class oriented party, the GNP. 
Non-members of the NJM were also given positions on statu- 
tory boards throughout Grenada, yet in general, power resided 
in the hands of the PRG. And during the years of the revolution 
there was an increased blurring of the boundaries between the 
PRG and the NJM. In addition, the two other political parties, 
Gairyls GULP and the GNP, for all interests and purposes, ceased 
to exist. At the national level, therefore, there was little 
or no opposition to the government's policies. 
It was, however, at the level of the ordinary people that 
broad opportunity was provided to meaningfully participate in 
t h e  a f f a i r s  of  t h e  s tate.  One of t h e  b e s t  examples of  p a r t i -  
c i p a t i o n  of t h e  masses i n  government decision-making w a s  i n  
t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  of  t h e  Nat iona l  Budget f o r  1982. That  p rocess  
began w i t h  a "Conference of Delegates  of Mass Organiza t ions  on 
t h e  Economy" he ld  i n  l a t e  January 1982. About 1 , 0 0 0  d e l e g a t e s  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  a l l  t h e  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s  p a r t i c i p a t e d .  This  
was followed by a s e r i e s  of 25 zonal  and p a r i s h  Counci ls  he ld  
throughout  t h e  count ry .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  meetings were a l s o  
organized  wi th  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  and t h e n  ano the r  g e n e r a l  
conference on t h e  economy. A l toge the r ,  approximately 20,000 
people  w e r e  involved i n  t h e  budget-making process  which 
culminated i n  t h e  budget  p r e s e n t a t i o n  by Finance M i n i s t e r  
Bernard Coard i n  a  p u b l i c  g a t h e r i n g  a t  t h e  Nat iona l  Convention 
Center  on March 9 t h ,  1982. 6 
The success  of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  e f f o r t  i n  t h e  making of t h e  
1982 budget  l e n t  credence t o  t h e  view t h a t  t h e  PRG w a s  s e r i o u s  
and s u c c e s s f u l  i n  b r ing ing  d i r e c t  democracy, through l o c a l  
assemblies  and mass conferences  t o  t h e  Grenadian popula t ion .  
And, i n  f a c t ,  t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  commission 
i n  J u l y ,  1983, l e d  many t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p roces s  of d i r e c t  
democracy would be  entrenched i n  a  new c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The c r i s i s  
i n  t h e  p a r t y  l ead ing  t o  i t s  takeover  by Marx is t  Coard, t h e  
subsequent a r r e s t  and d e a t h  of Maurice Bishop, and u l t i m a t e l y ,  
t h e  i nvas ion  by t h e  United S t a t e s ,  a l t o g e t h e r  e f f e c t i v e l y  
precluded any oppor tun i ty  f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  change. 
Economic Objec t ives :  
Undoubtedly t h e  PRG in t roduced  s i g n i f i c a n t  change t o  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e s ,  p rocesses  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  broad p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  t h e  Grenadian p o l i t i c a l  system. The same cannot  be  s a i d  
f o r  i t s  economic p o l i c i e s .  This  i s  n o t  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  
r h e t o r i c  and ideology of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  could l e a d  t h e  super-  
f i c i a l  observer  t o  t h i n k  of P R G ' s  economic p o l i c y  i n  Marxis t  
terms.  And even though t h e  r h e t o r i c  was r e v o l u t i o n a r y ,  t h e  
major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of economic p o l i c y  was i t s  pragmatism. 
Many f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  pragmatic approach. 
F i r s t l y ,  the PRG i n h e r i t e d  an economy t h a t  was i n  shambles. 
While government revenues were extremely low due t o  a  d i s -  
o rgan ized  and a lmost  non-functioning t a x  c o l l e c t i o n  system, 
expendi tures  were i n o r d i n a t e l y  h igh .  This  was t h e  r e s u l t  of 
a  combination of c o r r u p t i o n  i n  government and a  w e l l  developed 
p o l i t i c a l  pat ronage system, and extremely high expendi ture  
f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  branch of t h e  s t a t e .  A t  t h e  same t ime,  
a g r i c u l t u r e ,  a mainstay of t h e  economy, w a s  allowed t o  
d e t e r i o r a t e .  Even t h e  state-owned e s t a t e s  exper ienced much 
g r e a t e r  expendi ture  than  income. By 1978 t h e  va lue  of imports  
was more t h a n  double t h a t  f o r  e x p o r t s ,  which f u r t h e r  c o n t r i -  
buted t o  economic d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  
Secondly, much of t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  of t h e  N J M ,  now t h e  
r u l i n g  group i n  t h e  PRG, w e r e  young un ivers i ty -educa ted  profes -  
s i o n a l s ,  w i th  e s s e n t i a l l y  midd1.e-class paren tage .  And i n  l a r g e  
measure wh i l e  t h e i r  r h e t o r i c  r e f l e c t e d  t h a t  of t h e  oppressed 
groups i n  t h e  count ry ,  t h i s  approach se rved  t o  weld t h e  masses 
i n  u n i t y  a g a i n s t  an  i n c r e a s i n g  c o r r u p t  and d i c t a t o r i a l  regime. 
But t h i s  is  n o t  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  N J M  l e a d e r s h i p  was no t  a l s o  
moved by conv ic t ion .  T h e i r  cause ,  however, was more one of 
s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  t han  of v i o l e n t  l e f t i s t  r e v o l u t i o n .  T h e i r s  was 
i n  l a r g e l y  a  p o p u l i s t  movement. I t  i s  worth no t ing  t h a t  t h e  I 
ch ie f  Marx is t  t h e o r e t i c i a n  i n  t h e  N J M ,  Bernard Coard, w a s  a  
l a t e  comer t o  t h e  movement. I 
Thi rd ly ,  t h e  N J M ,  e s p e c i a l l y  throughout  t h e  1970 ' s  had 
worked i n  c l o s e  a l l i a n c e  wi th  t h e  G N P ,  t h e  p a r t y  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
t h e  Grenadian middle c l a s s .  E s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  t h e  even t s  of 
Bloody Sunday, i n  A p r i l  1974, t h e  middle class had tu rned  
a g a i n s t  t h e  c o r r u p t i o n  and b r u t a l i t y  of t h e  Gairy regime. I n  
1976 bo th  groups had j o i n t l y  fought  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  and 1 
a f t e r  t h e  takeover  of government i n  March 1979, some represen-  1 
t a t i v e s  of middle c l a s s  bus ines s ,  s a t  on t h e  r u l i n g  PRG c o u n c i l .  
For a l l  of  t h e  foregoing  f a c t o r s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  it w a s  a lmost  I 
i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  P R G ' s  approach t o  economic development 
would be in f luenced  l e s s  by ideology and more by pragmatic 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
I n  broad o u t l i n e  t h e  economic program of t h e  PRG emphasized 
1 I t h e  fo l lowing  o b j e c t i v e s :  
a )  concen t r a t i on  upon a g r i c u l t u r e  and tour ism wi th  t h e  
twin o b j e c t i v e s  of i n c r e a s i n g  employment and con- 
t r i b u t i n g  t o  f o r e i g n  exchange ea rn ings ;  
b )  r e h a b i l i t a t e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ;  I 
c)  s t i m u l a t e  p roduc t ive  investment  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  
through inc reased  p u b l i c  investment ,  and i n  t h e  co- 
o p e r a t i v e  s e c t o r ;  
d) improve the efficiency of the public sector. 
It was not surprising that the PRG would emphasize agri- 
culture, and more hesitatingly, tourism, as major focal points 
for economic development. Grenada, like all of the other 
former colonial Caribbean economies, with the possible exception 
of Trinidad, had inherited an economic system dependent upon 
the export of a few agricultural products, importing everything 
else, from the colonizer--a classic picture of a metropolitan 
dominated economy. And whereas over the long run, self-sustaining 
development processes, which would reduce the "openness" of the 
economy, must have been a primary objective of the PRG, the 
immediate demands for employment and foreign exchange earnings, 
meant that the existing agricultural system be maintained. 
Initially, the emphasis was upon increased output and efficiency 
of this sector as the immediate objectives. Tourism presented 
a similar problem. 
The PRG must have been aware that there are basic problems, 
in terms of the development process, associated with the 
existing model of "plantation" tourism. Nevertheless, when 
world market prices for Grenada's major agricultural exports: 
nutmeg, cocoa and bananas fell 22 percent between 1979 and 1980, 
and when the entire agricultural economy, also suffered from 
the devastating effects of two hurricanes during that period, 
there was little choice for the government but to return to 
tourism as a major motivator of the economy. 
Overall, the PRG was committed to a mixed economy, with 
t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  r e t a i n i n g  c o n t r o l  of about  two-thi rds  of 
a l l  economic a c t i v i t y .  And i n  an apparen t  retreat from t h e  
1973 mani fes to ,  t h e  only  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  undertaken were 
t h o s e  of E r i c  G a i r y ' s  pe r sona l  p roper ty :  t h r e e  h o t e l s ,  f o u r  
r e s t a u r a n t s  and t h i r t y - f i v e  a c r e s  of l and .  These w e r e  main- 
t a i n e d  as s ta te  e n t e r p r i s e s .  A s  p r ev ious ly  noted,  t h e  PRG 
had a l s o  i n h e r i t e d  twenty-six s t a t e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e s t a t e s ,  t h e  
legacy of G a i r y ' s  a t t empt  a t  s t a t e  ownership,  
The PRG was a l s o  determined t o  expand t h e  s t a t e  s e c t o r  
i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  development p rocess  be  has tened .  I t  w a s  
l o g i c a l  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  would t u r n  i n i t i a l l y  t o  a g r o - i n d u s t r i e s ,  
s i n c e  t h e  raw m a t e r i a l  w a s  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  and s i n c e  t h i s  
would reduce t h e  need f o r  f o r e i g n  food imports ,  and consequent ly ,  
f o r e i g n  exchange. A p l a n t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  t h e  process ing  
of l o c a l  f r u i t  i n t o  j u i c e s  and j e l l i e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a f i s h  
process ing  p l a n t  was b u i l t  by t h e  Nat iona l  F i s h e r i e s  Corporat ion.  
This  l a t t e r  body, i t s e l f ,  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1981 t o  develop 
t h e  f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y .  
The s ta te  then  tu rned  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  banking i n d u s t r y ,  
t h i s  being one of  t h e  s e c t o r s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  from t h e  
metropole.  While t h e  p r i v a t e  banking system cont inued i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h e  s t a t e  e s t a b l i s h e d  an a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  t h e  pub l i c ly -  
owned Nat iona l  Commercial Bank ( N C B ) .  Th is  bank acqui red  t h e  
ho ld ings  of t h e  Royal Bank of Canada which had v o l u n t a r i l y  
decided t o  t e rmina t e  i t s  bus ines s  i n  Grenada. The state-owned 
Grenada Development Bank, whose fo re runne r  was G a i r y ' s  Agricul-  
c u l t u r a l  Bank, cont inued t o  serve t h e  loan  needs of farmers  and 
s m a l l  bus ines s .  Two f o r e i g n  banks cont inued t o  f u n c t i o n  dur ing  
t h e  Bishop government c o n t r o l l i n g  a  l i t t l e  over  50 p e r c e n t  of 
t h e  banking bus ines s .  
Soon a f t e r  t h e  PRG began i t s  r u l e  a  Marketing and Nat iona l  
Import Board w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  This  gave t h e  s t a t e ,  through 
t h i s  Board, t h e  e x c l u s i v e  r i g h t  t o  import  t h e  b a s i c  food r equ i r e -  
ments f o r  i t s  popu la t ion ,  i nc lud ing  rice, sugar  and cement. The 
s t a t e ,  i n  keeping wi th  i t s  primary o b j e c t i v e  of feed ing  t h e  
popula t ion ,  was determined t h a t  b a s i c  n e c e s s i t i e s  would be  
a v a i l a b l e  a t  reasonable  p r i c e s .  The Board a l s o  was r equ i r ed  t o  
l o c a t e  e x p o r t  markets f o r  domestic a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduc ts .  
I n  s p i t e  of  t h e  s t e a d i l y  expanding s t a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t h e  
economy, between 1979-1983, t h i s  s e c t o r ,  a t  t h e  end of  t h a t  
fou r  yea r  pe r iod ,  accounted f o r  less than  25 pe rcen t  of t h e  
Gross Nat iona l  Product .  
Appra i sa l  of Domestic P o l i c i e s  and Programs 
A t  every  l e v e l  t h e  PRG faced  a formidable  t a s k  i n  e f f o r t s  
a t  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  and t r ans fo rma t ion  of t h e  Grenadian economy 
and s o c i e t y .  Many commentators would ag ree  t h a t  whi le  t h e i r  
performance exceeded e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  i n  s o c i a l  and 
economic programs, i n  o t h e r  axeas, d e f l c i e n c e s  were appa ren t ,  
With regard  t o  economic performance, t h e  World Bank r e p a r t e d  
t h a t  t h e  Grenadian economy grew by 2 , l  p e r c e n t  i n  1979, 3 p e r c e n t  
i n  bo th  1980 and 1981 and 5.5 p e r c e n t  i n  1982 .8 This  w a s  
s t i m u l a t e d  p a r t l y  by t h e  s t a t e ' s  c a p i t a l  investment  program. 
I n  t h e  l a s t  yea r  of G a i r y ' s  regime, c a p i t a l  investment  w a s  $8m. 
This  f i g u r e  w a s  doubled i n  1979, t h e  f i r s t  yea r  of t h e  revolu-  
t i o n ,  t o  $40m. i n  1980 and i n  1982 over  A s  a  consequence, 
whi le  unemployment s tood  a t  49 p e r c e n t  immediately p r i o r  t o  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  it dropped t o  14.2 pe rcen t  i n  1982. lo By t h a t  yea r  
whi le  i n f l a t i o n  s tood  a t  7 pe rcen t ,  wages i nc reased  by 10 p e r c e n t  
o r  a 3 p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  l i v i n g  s t anda rds .  
With t h e  emphasis upon meeting t h e  b a s i c  needs of t h e  pop- 
u l a t i o n ,  t h e  government 's  economic program went beyond t h e  
a l l e v i a t i o n  of t h e  unemployment problem. B a s i c  n e c e s s i t i e s  a s  
pipe-borne water a n d r u r a l  e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n  programs were e i t h e r  
upgraded, o r  begun i n  t hose  a r e a s  where t hey  w e r e  non-ex is ten t .  
By 1982, 49 m i l e s  of f e e d e r  roads ,  and 15 m i l e s  of main roads  
were b u i l t ,  f a c i l i t a t i n g  t h e  movement of a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduc ts .  
Major t r ans fo rma t ions  were undertaken i n  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  
programs. Thir ty-seven c e n t s  of every d o l l a r  of c a p i t a l  i n v e s t -  
ment were d i r e c t e d  toward h e a l t h  and education.'' The number 
of d o c t o r s  was almost  doubled,  from a r a t i o  of 1:4000 i n  1978 
Dental  c l i n i c s  i nc reased  from one t o  seven.  
Secondary educa t ion ,  formerly  t h e  p r e r o g a t i v e  of t h e  e l i t e  
a s  a consequence of t u i t i o n  f e e s ,  w a s  made f r e e .  Add i t i ona l ly ,  
f r e e  books, uniforms and lunches w e r e  provided,  a t  t h e  elemen- 
t a r y  l e v e l ,  f o r  c h i l d r e n  from lower-income f a m i l i e s .  While 
under Gairy Grenada had d e f a u l t e d  on payments t o  t h e  common 
for the qualified Grenadian students, such defaults were 
repaid after the revolution. Not only did Grenadians, there- 
fore, regain access to UWI but overall 109 Grenadians were 
awarded university scholarships, many of these to Cuban 
universities. While illiteracy in Grenada was relatively low, 
it was substantially higher among the older population. The 
Center for Popular Education--a literacy program directed toward 
the adult population--was organized with the aim of eradicating 
adult illiteracy by 1985. 
Other socio-economic programs included interest-free loans 
and low cost material to a substantial number of families for 
housing repair. In addition, the Sandino Housing Plant began 
production of prefabricated housing units, with an anticipated 
production schedule of 500 units per year. The two programs 
combined represented an imaginative effort to combat the problem 
of adequate housing. From all of the foregoing it is obvious 
that in the short four and one-half years of the PRG government 
substantial progress was made toward meeting basic needs of 
Grenadian population. 
Analysis of the politics of the revolution presents a more 
mixed picture. Having rejected the Westminster model, the PRG 
turned to a radically different, and difficult to implement 
approach, with a system of direct democracy through people's 
assemblies. Whereas the political culture favored the system 
of representative democracy, inherent in the existing Westminster 
system, the country's tradition, was reflected in a people whose 
primary concerns were essentially materialistic, and as a 
consequence, less concerned about a participatory democracy. 13 
Bishop himself explained the problem this way: 14 
"the nature of the struggle we have undergone, 
(is) not only to raise production and produc- 
tivity, but is to instill new values into our 
people. " 
But having believed that some progress was already achieved 
in introducing people's assemblies, as evidenced by the mass 
budget hearings of 1982, the PRG had formally announced the 
establishment of a constitutional commission which would 
"institutionalize and entrench the systems of popular demo- 
cracy. " 15 
Relatedly, was the issue of elections. The PRG had gained 
office by forceful overthrow of the Gairy government. During 
their period of rule there was no attempt to legitimize their 
position through elections. Presumably, the new constitution 
would have been the forerunner to national elections. The 
government faced much criticism, from within the region, and 
internationally, as a consequence. Dissent was more muted at 
home. Many would argue that this was a consequence of the 
intimidating presence of the People's Revolutionary Army. 
Practically, as well, leaders of dissent were probably all in 
jail. There were about 100 political detainees by October 1983. 
Few had been charged with crimes and even fewer had gone to 
trial. 
Among the dissenters jailed were the leaders of the non- 
government p r e s s .  Soon a f t e r  t h e  takeover  of t h e  government 
t h e  t h r e e  newspapers w e r e  c lo sed  down, i nc lud ing  one which 
dec l a red  i t s e l f  l o y a l ,  y e t  r e s e r v i n g  f o r  i t s e l f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
c r i t i c i z e  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n .  
The c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  domes t i ca l ly ,  d i d  
n o t  d e t r a c t  from t h e  e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s i p s  developed and pursued 
by t h e  PRG. Indeed t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  pursued such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
a g g r e s s i v e l y ,  even i n  t h e  f a c t  of r a p i d l y  e s c a l a t i n g  t e n s i o n s  
w i th  t h e  United S t a t e s .  To a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  
be l i eved  t h a t  t h e  b u i l d i n g  of n a t i o n a l  independence domes t i ca l ly ,  
was i n e x t r i c a b l y  l i nked  t o  independence i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and 
from s u p p o r t e r s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  environment. 
The PRG i n  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Environment 
Between independence and t h e  1979 r e v o l u t i o n  Grenadian 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  l i k e  t h e  s o c i e t y ,  was dominated by E r i c  Gairy .  
Consequently, t h a t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  
t endenc ie s  of t h e  l e a d e r ,  making i s s u e s  a s  UFO's, t h e  Bermuda 
Tr i ang le ,  psychic  r e s e a r c h  and t h e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  of God, a s  
t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i s s u e s  a r t i c u l a t e d  by Grenada a t  t h e  United 
Nations.  16 
The PRG faced  two immediate and u rgen t  problems which 
a r o s e  from domestic p r e s s u r e s  and served t o  shape t h e  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  of t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e .  F i r s t  was g e t t i n g  t h e  economy 
moving, r e f l e c t e d  i n  a f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  of s ea rch  f o r  development 
a s s i s t a n c e  from f r i e n d l y  states and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l end ing  
agencies. The second problem was the perceived threat of a 
Gairy-led invasion of the island. This fear was reflected in 
a foreign policy that sought security assistance and recognition 
of the revolution especially from neighboring, and traditionally 
friendly states. This fear, nevertheless, encouraged Grenada 
to seek new allies to secure the revolution. This is not to 
state that the party, the NJM, had not previously outlined the 
broad principles of its foreign policy, since the thrust of 
the movement was predominantly anti-imperialist and anti- 
colonialist. 
The broad foreign policy principles of Grenada, since 
February 1979, could be summarized as follows: respect for 
the principle of ideological pluralism; Latin America and the 
Caribbean should be recognized as a zone of peace; self- 
determination for all peoples; respect for sovereign equality 
and territorial integrity regardless of size; end to support 
for anti-democratic and anti-progressive regimes. 17 
To confront the two major problems, Prime Minister Bishop 
approached a number of countries including Cuba, Canada, Britain 
and the United States for assistance. Indeed, as Bishop later 
pointed out, on the second day of the revolution, Grenada had 
discussed with the United States' Ambassador to the region, 
Frank Ortiz, the urgent need for assistance in rebuilding its 
economy. The U.S., at that point, having no significant bi- 
lateral aid programs in the Caribbean, recommended Grenada look 
to the U.S. supported Caribbean Development Bank. 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  U.S. Ambassador o f f e r e d  t h e  now famous $5,000 
which was " t h e  then-allowed l e v e l  of funding p e r  p r o j e c t  which 
an Ambassador could make from ( t h e )  S p e c i a l  Development 
Ass i s t ance  Fund. 11 18 
Among t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  from which a s s i s t a n c e  was r eques t ed ,  
on ly  Cuba responded promptly,  which s t i r r e d  t h e  immediate 
wrath  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  Within one month of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  
t h e  U . S .  Ambassador on a v i s i t  t o  Grenada, conveyed t h e  p o s i t i o n  
of h i s  government s t a t i n g :  19 
"Although my government recognizes  your concerns  
over  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n s  of a  p o s s i b l e  counter-coup,  
it a l s o  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i t  would not  be i n  Grenada's  
b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  t o  seek a s s i s t a n c e  from a  country  
as Cuba t o  f o r e s t a l l  such an a t t a c k .  We would 
view wi th  d i s p l e a s u r e  any tendency on t h e  p a r t  of 
Grenada t o  develop c l o s e r  t i e s  wi th  Cuba.'' 
Bishop and t h e  PRG w e r e  incensed by t h e  i n s e n s i t i v i t y  of 
t h e  United S t a t e s  and i n  a  p u b l i c  speech t h r e e  days l a t e r  
r e i t e r a t e d  t h e  broad o b j e c t i v e s  of Grenadian f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
d e c l a r i n g Z o  "we do no t .  . . recognize  any r i g h t  of t h e  United 
S t a t e s . . . t o  i n s t r u c t  us  on whom w e  may develop r e l a t i o n s  wi th  
and who we may no t . . . "  And he cont inued:  21  
"Grenada i s  a  sovere ign  and independent count ry  ... 
W e  are n o t  i n  anybody's  back-yard, and we are 
d e f i n i t e l y  n o t  f o r  s a l e . "  
And then  i n  an  a c t  of seeming d e f i a n c e  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
Grenada e s t a b l i s h e d  formal  d ip loma t i c  r e l a t i o n s  wi th  Cuba t h e  
nex t  day. I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  Frank O r t i z ,  a c t i n g  on behalf  of t h e  
U.S. government, c l e a r l y  blundered by pe rpe tua t ing  t h e  b i g  
s t i c k  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  of t h e  United S t a t e s  on a new r a d i c a l  
government determined to exercize its sovereignty. 
From that point onwards, the steady deterioration of 
Grenada's relations with the United States was matched by 
increasingly closer linkages to Cuba. This deterioration, 
which had actually begun during the Carter Administration, was 
greatly intensified during the Reagan period. Sally Shelton, 
Ortiz's successor, during the Carter years stated: 2 2  
"I do believe that ... the Carter and Reagan policies 
of distancing ourselves from Grenada, of refusing 
to exchange ambassadors, of declining to engage 
in serious discussions...were not conducive to 
improving relations and providing an alternative 
to Cuba." 
She did, however, emphasize 2 3  
"I am extremely skeptical ... that a more sustained 
experiment with a positive U.S. policy would have 
succeeded. But we should have tried..." 
Cuba's support for revolutionary Grenada, developed rapidly 
after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Much 
of that ocuntryls aid was in the form of technical assistance 
to facilitate Grenada's development process, scholarships for 
university education in Cuba, personnel to support the govern- 
ment's health programs and in sports and culture. During the 
period, too, ten fishing trawlers were provided to assist the 
building of Grenada's fishing industry. Eventually, however, 
that particular program was relatively unsuccessful, for it was 
later reported 24 
"of the ten boats that were donated to us by Cuba 
only two that are working--eight are not functioning. 
... It was also reported that the National Fishing 
Company lost about sixty percent of its revenue." 
Within a yea r  t r a d e  between t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i nc reased  d rama t i ca l ly  
as Grenada began purchasing some of  i t s  b a s i c  n e c e s s i t i e s :  food 
and housing m a t e r i a l  from Cuba. I t  w a s ,  however, Cuba's suppor t  
f o r  t h e  b u i l d i n g  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i r p o r t  i n  Grenada t h a t  
was most d ramat ic ,  and t o  which t h e  U.S. r e a c t e d  most f o r c e f u l l y .  
The A i r p o r t  I s s u e  
A t  t h e  o u t s e t  it is  v e r y  impor tan t  t o  unders tand t h a t  it 
was no t  t h e  PRG who i n i t i a t e d  t h e  i d e a  of a  new a i r p o r t .  A t  
one t i m e  o r  ano the r ,  s i n c e  1955, t h e  s u b j e c t  of a  new a i r p o r t  
was a  major i t em f o r  governmental d i s c u s s i o n  and s tudy .  The 
r a t i o n a l e  was obvious.  The e x i s t i n g  a i r p o r t  a t  P e a r l s  i s  
5,500 f e e t  long ,  s u f f i c i e n t  on ly  f o r  t h e  needs of turbo-prop 
p l anes  of l e s s  t h a n  50 passengers .  I ts l o c a t i o n  between t h e  
mountain and t h e  sea pe rmi t s  no room f o r  expansion.  I t  f u n c t i o n s  
on ly  du r ing  t h e  d a y l i g h t  s i n c e  t h e r e  are no n i g h t  l and ing  
f a c i l i t i e s .  Thus v i s i t o r s  t o  Grenada i n  t h e  evening must s t a y  
ove rn igh t  i n  Barbados. Previous  governments have a l l  recognized 
t h e  importance of tour i sm t o  t h e  economy demands an  a i r p o r t  of 
a t  l e a s t  9,000 f e e t  t o  accomodate modern j e t  a i r c r a f t .  F u r t h e r ,  
neighboring S t .  Lucia had exper ienced an a lmost  300 pe rcen t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  tour i sm a f t e r  i t s  new 9,000 f o o t  Beranorra a i r p o r t  
was cons t ruc t ed  i n  t h e  mid-1970ts. And f i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  were 
a t  least  t e n  a i r p o r t s  i n  t h e  r eg ion  a l r e a d y  of t h e  s i z e  contem- 
p l a t e d  by Grenada. I r o n i c a l l y ,  t h e  a i r p o r t  a t  Barbados, 
e x t e n s i v e l y  used by t h e  U.S. dur ing  t h e  i nvas ion  i s  1 1 , 0 0 0  f e e t .  
The U.S. never quest ionned t h e  b u i l d i n g  of t h a t  one,  nor ,  f o r  
instance, those at St. Lucia, Martinique or Guadeloupe. It 
was not surprising, therefore, that the renewed emphasis upon 
tourism to the Grenadian economy, would again focus attention 
upon the need to construct a new airport. And this after a 
World Bank study had concluded that tourism was the main hope 
of the country for financial solvency. 
Grenada first turned to the U.S., Britain, and Canada for 
assistance to build the airport. Not only did the U.S. refuse 
such assistance but sort to persuade other countries to do 
likewise. Some succumbed under U.S. pressure. In 1981 when 
Grenada organized a conference at Brussels seeking aid, the 
U.S. pressured its European allies to stay away. However, with 
assistance from Cuba, the EEC, acting independently of its 
individual members, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Venezuela and 
Nigeria airport construction commenced with the anticipated 
date of completion set for the 1984 anniversary of the revolu- 
tion. 
Overall, Cuba's contribution to the airport construction 
project was substantial--about 40 percent of total cost. 
However, most of this contribution was in the form of manpower-- 
about 300 workers, and construction supplies. Cuba developed 
a quarry and built the first rock-crushing plant and asphalt 
mixing facility--illustrations of the low level of pre-existing 
infrastructure, and the need for modernization of Grenada. In 
addition, excavation work at the airport was being undertaken 
by Layne Dredging Company of Miami, and the airport's communica- 
tion system was being installed by Plessey, a British company. 
Whereas Grenadians saw the airport as a major symbol of 
their independence and a primary contributor to their economic 
welfare, the U.S., and especially President Reagan, was 
increasingly obsessed with the notion that the sole purpose of 
the airport was to facilitate Cuban-Soviet expansion and threaten 
the security of the United States. The U.S. Administration 
believed that this airport would serve as a major refuelling 
point on Cuba's way to Angola and also as a base to harrass U.S. 
shipping especially regarding the passage of oil to the U.S. 
Cuba, however, had been involved in Angola since 1975 and there- 
fore, obviously had no refuelling problems. Neither Trinidad 
nor Venezuela, the states whose shipping could have been most 
affected felt threatened. Indeed neither supported the u.S. 
invasion. 
Even within the State Department there was skepticism 
concerning the Administration's hysteria over the airport. 25 
One official in particular confessed to "not being terribly 
worried" about the airport construction elaborating that he 
"never put much stress on the stategic importance of this whole 
region." Another hypothesized that U.S. opposition to the 
airport construction had served only to "push Bishop further 
to the left." 
Nevertheless, on March 23, 1983, Mr. Reagan, in his 
nationally-televised "Star Wars" speech declared 26 
"On the small island of Grenada...the Cubans 
with Soviet financing and backing, are in the 
process of building an airfield with a 10,000 
foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an 
airforce ... More than half of all American oil 
imports now pass through the Caribbean...The 
Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada...can 
only be seen as power project into the region." 
For six days after this speech various U.S. television crews, 
sought the supposed Grenadian military base; the supposed 
military communication facilities, and finally the so-called 
military barracks, none of which were found. This did not 
prevent the Reagan Administration from resurrecting the same 
fraudulent charges as partial rationale for the invasion eight 
months later. 
It was not so much the construction of the Grenada airport 
that peaked the hostility of the U.S., as it was the rapid 
shift of Grenada's foreign policy toward close relations with 
Cuba, and with revolutionary movements within and outside the 
region. Located within the American sphere of influence while 
Cuba, and to some degree Nicaragua, were able to pursue foreign 
policies which contradicted "sphere of influence" theory and 
policy, the U.S. was determined that no other country would be 
permitted this luxury. 
Soon after the takeover of the government and in keeping 
with the 1973 manifesto of the NJM, the PRG had announced a 
foreign policy based on the principle of non-alignment. Grenada 
rapidly gained membership in that movement, and participated 
in the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Havana, in 
September 1979. As if to further emphasize its commitment to 
t h e  group,  it was e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  Co-ordinating Bureau. None 
of t h i s  se rved  t o  enhance Grenada's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  United 
S t a t e s .  
A f u r t h e r  r a d i c a l i z a t i o n  of Grenada's f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  was 
e v i d e n t  when t h a t  country  vo ted  wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union i n  t h e  
U . N .  General  Assembly's deba t e  on t h e  USSR's i nvas ion  of 
Afganis tan .  I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  t h e  consequences of  t h a t  v o t e  i n  
t e r m s  of Washington's pe rcep t ion  of t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  which 
Grenada w a s  going,  must l e a d  one t o  conclude t h a t  Grenada made 
a t a c t i c a l  e r r o r .  For Grenada could have a b s t a i n e d ,  b u t  d i d  
n o t .  Consequently a s  s een  through Washington's eyes ,  i f  
Grenada was merely a c l o s e  f r i e n d  of Cuba b e f o r e  t h a t  v o t e ,  
a f t e rwards ,  it was viewed as f i r m l y  f i x e d  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  camp. 
The United S t a t e s  i nc reased  i t s  p r e s s u r e  on Grenada, both 
on t h e  l e v e l  of r h e t o r i c  and more e f f e c t i v e l y ,  by p r e s s u r i n g  i t s  
a l l i e s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l end ing  agenc ies ,  a g a i n s t  suppor t ing  
Grenada. I n  i t s  t u r n ,  t h e  Grenadian l e a d e r s h i p ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  
Maurice Bishop, engaged i n  r h e t o r i c a l  e x e r c i z e s ,  much of which 
were e q u a l l y  exces s ive .  This  w a s  done f o r  two reasons .  Poss ib ly  
t h e  only  weapon t h a t  a smal l  s t a t e ,  and i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  micro- 
s t a t e ,  can employ a g a i n s t  t h e  b i g ,  i s  r h e t o r i c .  And i n  Grenada's  
c a s e ,  t h e r e  was no such l ack .  More fundamentally,  U . S .  p r e s s u r e ,  
and Bishop 's  responses ,  served t o  weld t h e  Grenadian s o c i e t y  
t o g e t h e r ,  and b u i l d  popular  suppor t  f a r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  i n  a 
manner c l e a r l y  unintended by t h e  W.S. 
This  i s  no t  t o  s t a t e ,  t h a t  t h e  PRG was n o t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
f e a r f u l  of U.S. e f f o r t s  a t  d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  and t h e  repercus-  
s i o n s  of t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  g a i n  t h e  suppor t  of t h e  U.S. 
This  was p r e c i s e l y  one of t h e  reasons  f o r  Bishop 's  t r i p  t o  
t h e  U.S. i n  June 1983, when he  s t a t e d :  27 
". . .bad r e l a t i o n s  do n o t  make sense .  From 
our  p o i n t  of view, t h e  need t o  ensu re  t h a t  
even more American v i s i t o r s  come t o  o u r  count ry  
every  yea r  i s  a c r i t i c a l  and burning need." 
Another o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  t r i p ,  he  cont inued 28 
"was t o  t r y  y e t  aga in  t o  e s t a b l i s h  some form of 
o f f i c i a l  c o n t a c t ,  an  o f f i c i a l  d i a logue ,  w i th  
t h e  government of t h e  United S t a t e s . "  
I r o n i c a l l y  f o r  Maurice Bishop, t h i s  e f f o r t  a t  a t t empt ing  
t o  mend r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  U . S .  on ly  served t o  i n c r e a s e  
f a c t i o n a l i s m  w i t h i n  t h e  N J M  domes t i ca l ly ,  Within t h e  C e n t r a l  
Committee of t h e  p a r t y ,  i t s  l e a d e r  began t o  be  perce ived  a s  
s o f t ,  indeed " p e t i t  bourgeois"  r a t h e r  t han  "Marxis t -Leninis t ."  
The r e s u l t  of  which w a s  t h e  s p l i t  i n  t h e  p a r t y  and u l t i m a t e l y  
t h e  downfall  of  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n .  
The C r i s i s  i n  t h e  New Jewel  Movement 
The s t r u g g l e  between Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard a s  
it mani fes ted  i t s e l f  w i t h i n  t h e  p a r t y ,  and i t s  cu lmina t ion  i n  
t h e  d e a t h  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  l ends  i t s e l f  t o  a n a l y s i s  on two 
l e v e l s .  The f i r s t  i s  concerned wi th  t h e  i s s u e  of ideology,  o r  
more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  " p u r i t y "  of t h e  N J M ,  A 
s tudy  of t h e  Minutes of N J M ' s  C e n t r a l  Committee meet ings ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  two months p r i o r  t o  t h e  U . S .  e n t r y ,  r e v e a l s  
the repeated charges of "ideological backwardness," "economism," 
"right opportunism," and "petit bourgeois" attitudes against 
Bishop and some NJM members. There was, therefore, the demand, 
emanating from the Central Committee, that a choice be made 
between "petit bourgeois" democratic socialism, perceived as 
the "rightist path," and the Marxist-Leninist approach. This 
appears, then, to be the classic struggle between the moderates 
and the extremists. The other level, more difficult to analyze 
because of its subjectivity, is that political theory, and even 
the employment of linguistic skills, was merely a cover for a 
group within the party, orchestrated by Bernard Caard, which 
was intent upon seizing power for their own opportunistic 
purposes. 
Formerly, the struggle initally became evident, when 
Bernard Coard resigned from his positions on the Political 
Bureau and the Central Committee of the NJM in October 1982. 
His wife, Phyllis, nevertheless retained membership on the 
latter committee. The Central Committee's minutes claim the 
reason for his resignation was 24 
"the slack and weak functioning of the C.C. 
(Central Committee) the P .B (Political 
Bureau), the vacillation and lack of 
collective leadership." 
This was the first occasion when the issue of "collective 
leadership" was raised, but Coard appeared to lay blame on 
Central Committee members who were generally ill-prepared for 
meetings, thereby not able to "lead collectively." 30 1t was 
t h a t  same meeting which a l s o  charged Bishop wi th  "weak chairman- 
s h i p  and l eade r sh ip . "  Pu t  t oge the r :  t h e  charges  and t h e  
r e s i g n a t i o n  by Coard, and s i m i l a r  charges  l e v e l l e d  by t h e  C e n t r a l  
Committee a g a i n s t  Bishop, could l e a d  t o  t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  t h i s  
was t h e  opening a t t empt  by Coard and h i s  group f o r  takeover  of 
t h e  p a r t y  and t h e  government, 
But t h e  r o o t s  of t h e  Coard f a c t i o n  yo back t o  t h e  e a r l y  
1970 ' s  when Coard organized t h e  Organiza t ion  of Revolut ionary 
Education and L i b e r a t i o n  (QREL),  OREL w a s  a s tudy  group no t  a 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y ,  which Coard used t o  t each  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  of 
Marxism and i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  smal l - sca le  economies. Thus when 
t h e  MAP and J e w e l ,  two s e p a r a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  fused  i n t o  t h e  
N J M  i n  1973, Coard 's  group came i n  a s  w e l l ,  b u t  a s  Don Rojas ,  
Bishop 's  p r e s s  s e c r e t a r y  l a t e r  claimed, 31 "always mainta ined a 
kind of  c l i q u e ,  a n  OREL c l i q u e ,  w i t h i n  t h e  New J e w e l  Movement 
dur ing  t h e  1970 ' s  and even a f t e r  t h e  1979 r e v o l u t i o n . "  
Whereas t h e  Coard f a c t i o n  had placed t h e  s t r u g g l e  on f i r m l y  
i d e o l o g i c a l  grounds,  Coard was however shrewd i n  a l s o  conso l ida-  
t i n g  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  founda t ions .  Simply p u t ,  he  maneuvered, 
e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  r e s i g n i n g  from p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  p a r t y ,  t o  p l a c e  
h i s  suppor t e r s  i n  key p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  appara tus  of t h e  
government, t h e  army and on t h e  C e n t r a l  Committee, H e  d i d  t h i s  
i n  a very  sys t ema t i c  way "so  t h a t  when he decided t o  make h i s  
move f o r  l e a d e r s h i p  of t h e  p a r t y ,  he had a l r e a d y  conso l ida t ed  
h i s  power base .  "32 I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  no te ,  though, t h a t  he  
never sought t o  g a i n  any i n f l u e n c e  w i t h  t h e  working class of 
t h e  s o c i e t y .  Indeed,  he appears  t o  have d i scounted  t h e i r  
participation in his drive for power. His underestimation of 
this group, and its support for Bishop, counted heavily in the 
final outcome of the struggle. 
Even though the campaign against Bishop simmered for a 
year, it did not openly and very suddenly become the major 
crisis facing the party and the country until an extraordinary 
meeting of the Central Committee was called for September 14-16, 
1983. And indeed it was not until the last day of that meeting 
were specific charges levelled at Bishop, followed by the 
proposal for "joint leadership." The timing is significant, in 
that the Central Committee had earlier met in a six and one- 
half day plenary in July 1983 and had conceded33 that there was 
the continued failure of the party "to transform itself ... along 
a Leninist path." The Committee also recognized there was "the 
spreading of anti-communism within the country." However, no 
criticisms were directed against Bishop and no proposals for 
joint leadership were offered. 
When the Central Committee met again on August 26, 1983, 
34 Liam James, a protege of Coard asserted "we are seeing the 
beginning of the disintegration of the party," the blame for 
which was placed with the Central Committee, according to 
Selwyn Strachan and Unison Whiteman. 35 Again, no criticisms 
were directed against Bishop's leadership. 
The beginning of the end of the revolution came on the third 
morning of the'mid-September meeting of the Central Committee. 
Having agreed with the earlier conclusions that the party was 
in a serious state of disarray because the Central Committee 
"is on path of right opportunism" having "diverted from the 
correct path," the meeting went on to an analysis of the 
Central Committee itself. 36 Liam James led off the discussion 
claiming 37 
"What is needed is firm Leninism. ..the 
fundamental problem is the quality of 
leadership ... by Cde. Maurice Bishop." 
While James was willing to concede that Bishop did possess many 
positive characteristics, he nevertheless concluded that 38 
"today these strengths alone cannot put the 
party any further in this period. The qualities 
he lacks (are) . . . 
1. A Leninist level of organization and 
discipline. 
2. Great depth in ideological clarity. 
3. Brilliance in strategy and tactics. 
These qualities ... are essential for Marxist- 
Leninist leadership." 
It is clear that the issue of leadership was being placed 
within the context of ideological "purity." Leon Cornwall 
continued the criticism in a similar vein, but more eloquently 
stated: 39 
"history has placed a great responsibility on 
our shoulders which we must seek to deal with 
in the correct and scientific way." 
Phyllis Coard was much more blunt in her criticism of Bishop. 40 
She claimed that he was "disorganized" and "avoided responsi- 
bilities." Whe further asserted that "some comrades are scared 
to criticize him because he is hostile to criticism." 
James, who had initiated the discussion, brought the issue 
to a head by formally proposing a model of joint leadership with 
Bishop essentially responsible for working with the masses 
and in the international arena, and Coard concentrating upon 
party development. This proposal initiated further heated 
discussion with George Louison formly opposed to it on the 
basis that material conditions in Grenada were the source of 
difficulties. Whiteman suggested that Coard be delegated 
specific functions as deputy leader. 41 But as Strachan 
emphasized42 the proposal was made for 
"the transformation of the party which will 
also help to transform the Cde. leader into 
a Marxist-Leninist and to Leninise the Central 
Committee. " 
Phyllis Coard not only agreed with Strachan but further 
emphasized that dual leadership should be "not only for a 
short term but on a long term basis."43 Even though Bernard 
Coard was not present at these meetings his interests were 
obviously well represented. When the vote was taken on the 
formalization of joint leadership nine were in favor, one 
(Louison) opposed, and three abstained. Significantly, on 
another vote to inform the masses of the decision nine were 
opposed with three abstentions. Bishop requested time to 
personally consider the joint leadership resolution but 
suggested to the Committee that they begin meeting with Coard 
on that issue. 
While the Central Committee continued to meet daily between 
September 17 and 24, Bishop attended none of these meetings. 
He was persuaded by a Central Committee delegation on September 
25th, 1983 to attend. One of the primary reasons was the fact 
that after the meeting of September 16, power had clearly shifted 
to the Coard faction. Coard himself began attending Central 
Committee meetings on September 17, at which time he expressed 
the view that Bishop was "vacillating between the Marxist- 
Leninist trend and the petit bourgeois trend. "44 Playing upon 
the sympathies of the Central Committee he expressed an inability 
to criticise Bishop if he was forced to maintain the position 
of deputy leader. The implication was clear--he would only 
act authoritatively if given a position of authority, that is, 
joint leadership with Bishop. From September 19 sessions of 
the Central Committee were chaired by Coard. 
The final confrontation between Bishop and the Coard faction 
over the leadership issue occurredom. Sunday 25th September. In 
this meeting the question of the ideological direction of the 
party as compared to Bishop's supposed direction, became the 
focus of discussion, and the grounds for the determination of 
Bishop's future role in the party. Again, therefore, the Coard 
faction, at least, superficially, was able to shift the dis- 
cussion to theoretical grounds. And as if to underscore that 
emphasis, Liam James stated45 "our whole approach to this 
question must be totally cold-blooded, honest and objective." 
At this meeting in particular, members outdid themselves 
with Marxist rhetorical excesses. All the "proper" words and 
phrases were employed. Indeed linguistic skill appeared almost 
to be an end in itself. As though to increase the drama of 
the moment, and possibly to impress their colleagues as well, 
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his faction consistently argued that the masses should not be 
involved and should not be informed of the joint leadership 
proposal. As James himself declared, "joint leadership is an 
internal party matter and is not to be brought to the masses." 4 8  
As previously stated the Committee had voted down the proposal 
to inform the masses on the joint leadership issue. Indeed 
after large demonstrations commenced in St. Georges, after the 
house arrest of Bishop Coard's attitude was 49 
"they (the people) could stay in the street 
for weeks, after a while they are bound to 
get tired and hungry and want peace ... Williams 
did it in 1970 and survived, Gairy did it in 
'73 to us." 
After the U.S. invasion Louison on reflection expressed the 
view that by the time of the house arrest "Bernard and company 
no longer cared about the masses of the people. I150 
The general question to whether the Coard's group was 
motivated by ideological purity or a crass quest for power was 
later addressed by Fidel Castro in his funeral oration on 
November 14. Questioning these motivations he stated, 51 
Somewhat 
"The fact is that allegedly revolutionary 
arguments were used, invoking the purest 
principles of Marxism-Leninism and charging 
Bishop with practising a cult of personality." 
rhetorically, he continued, 
"were those who conspired against him (Bishop) 
within the Grenadian party. . .a group of 
extremists drunk on political theory, (or) 
were they simply a group of ambitious, oppor- 
tunistic individuals?" 
Don Rojas, Bishop's press secretary, answers Castro's somewhat 
rhetorical question: 52 
"I t h i n k  Lenin was being used a s  a cove r . . .  
It  appears  t h a t  t h e  c a l l  f o r  a more L e n i n i s t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  was misused t o  cover  up what was 
i n  i t s  essence  a b i d  f o r  power." 
From l a t e  September u n t i l  October 8 t h ,  Bishop, Whiteman, 
Louison and Rojas were o u t  of Grenada v i s i t i n g  Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and l a s t l y  Cuba, s eek ing  development a s s i s t a n c e .  
Coard and h i s  group used t h i s  pe r iod  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n ,  i nc lud ing  disarming m i l i t a r y  groups l o y a l  t o  Bishop. 
Soon a f t e r  Bishop r e tu rned  t o  Grenada even t s  moved r a p i d l y .  
He w a s  p laced under house a r r e s t  on October 1 2 ,  and p laced  on 
" t r i a l "  t h e  nex t  day.  Within a n  hour of h i s  r e l e a s e  by t h e  
Grenadian popu la t ion  on October 19 ,  Bishop, t h r e e  c a b i n e t  
members and two l a b o r  l e a d e r s  were executed by f o r c e s  l o y a l  
t o  Coard. The U.S. invaded on October 25th .  
Regional  Responses t o  t h e  C r i s i s  
Whereas t h e  English-speaking Caribbean w a s  undoubtedly 
t raumat ized  by t h e  overthrow of Gairy  i n  1979, t h i s  being t h e  
f i r s t  occas ion  where governmental change was i n i t i a t e d  by non- 
peace fu l  means among t h e s e  former B r i t i s h  c o l o n i e s ,  t h e s e  
t e r r i t o r i e s  had, more o r  less, come t o  t e r m s  wi th  t h e  Bishop 
regime dur ing  t h e  i n t e r v e n i n g  pe r iod .  A number of f a c t o r s  
promoted acceptance of t h e  new s t a t u s  quo i n  Grenada. 
Gai ry ,  a s  Prime M i n i s t e r ,  had a t  b e s t  been regarded a s  a 
maverick by Caribbean l e a d e r s h i p ,  and a t  wor s t ,  an  embarrassment 
t o  t h e  r eg ion .  Very few, t h e r e f o r e ,  shed tears a t  h i s  d e p a r t u r e ,  
though t h e  method employed, was h a r s h l y  c r i t i c i z e d .  Secondly, 
while Caribbean economies generally stagnated during the past 
five years, most were willing to agree that real economic 
progress was forthcoming in Grenada during the same period. 
Such economic progress became a major source for the 
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legitimacy of the Bishop government. Thirdly, not only did 
the region finally accept the principle of "ideological 
pluralism," among its membership, but Bishop, during the 
last year of leadership, had gradually moved toward democrati- 
zation of the political system--the establishment of the 
Constitutional Commission being the most tangible expression 
to this desire. And finally, Bishop had begun to achieve much 
of what Caribbean leadership desired: national mobilization 
domestically, together with autonomy and independence in 
international relationships. It is understandable, therefore, 
why Caribbean leadership reacted in horror to the assassination 
of Bishop and some of his colleagues. 
The horror was intensified both by the brutality of the 
event, again contrary to the norms of regional behavior, and 
by the recognition that the group assuming power--"a group 
of ~ascists"~~--were willing to employ whatever means 
necessary, to maintain such power. The employment of armored 
cars against the population in which over fifty were killed, 
and the declaration of the repressive curfew, were perceived 
as forerunners to the new regime's behavior. Moreover, members 
of the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (0 .E .C . S . ) , 
were immediately alarmed by the precedent-setting nature of 
the Grenada situation, and the possibility that radical  groups 
w i t h i n  t h e i r  own t e r r i t o r i e s  would d e c l a r e  suppor t  f o r  t h e  
Coard group. 
Response of t h e  O.E.C.S. 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e p a r a t e  t h e  response of t h e  O.E.C.S. 
from t h a t  of Barbados, and l a t e r ,  even Jamaica.  While t h e s e  
two l a t t e r  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  non-members of t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
Barbados p a r t i c i p a t e s  w i t h  some O.E.C.S. members i n  a r e g i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y  arrangement,  and p a r t l y  f o r  t h a t  reason ,  assumed 
l e a d e r s h i p  i n  coo rd ina t ing  responses  t o  t h e  r a p i d l y  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  
Grenada crisis. F u r t h e r ,  a l l  of t h e  English-speaking c o u n t r i e s  
have membership i n  t h e  Caribbean Economic Community which l a t e r  
--some would say ,  t o o  late--began deba t ing  p o s s i b l e  responses .  
Regardless  of  t h e  over lapping  r e g i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  involved,  
t h e  g e n e r a l  sen t iment  of  t h e  O.E.C.S. was t h a t  Grenada w a s  "our 
problem" which members were r equ i r ed  t o  s o l v e .  5 4  This  a t t i t u d e  
was i n  keeping wi th  t h e  r i s i n g  "b loc"  consciousness  of t h e  O.E.C.S. 
v i s -a -v i s  o t h e r  English-speaking s tates,  supported by agg res s ive  
and a r t i c u l a t e  l e a d e r s h i p  provided by Char les  of Dominica and 
Compton of S t .  Lucia .  But t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  d i s c o u n t  t h e  d e s i r e  
of Tom Adams of Barbados t o  ups tage  Tr in idad  f o r  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  
Eas t e rn  Caribbean,  and recogniz ing  i n  t h e  Grenadian c r i s i s ,  and 
h i s  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  wi th  O.E.C.S. l e a d e r s h i p ,  t h e  oppor tun i ty  
t o  do s o .  
By October 20th,  t h e  day a f t e r  Bishop ' s  d e a t h  it became 
apparen t  t o  t h e  Revolut ionary M i l i t a r y  Counci l ,  o s t e n s i b l y  t h e  
group assuming p6wer i n  Grenada, t h a t  they  w e r e  being r a p i d l y  
i s o l a t e d  by r e g i o n a l  members. Hudson Aus t in ,  t h e  Counc i l ' s  
l e a d e r ,  sought  advice  and guidance from D r .  Geoffrey Bouyne, 
Vice Chancel lor  of t h e  Medical School. 55 Aust in  a l s o  arranged 
a meeting wi th  Mil ton Cato,  Prime M i n i s t e r  of neighboring S t .  
Vincent.  Cato,  f o r  h i s  p a r t ,  was f e a r f u l  f o r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of 
a Grenadian r e fugee  s i t u a t i o n  developing,  and conce ivab le  adverse  
r e a c t i o n  from t h e  M i l i t a r y  Counci l .  0 .E .C .S. members, never the-  
l e s s ,  p r e s su red  Cato a g a i n s t  meeting wi th  Aus t in  s i n c e  they  
d e s i r e d  a p o l i c y  of i s o l a t i o n  and non-recogni t ion of t h e  Grena- 
d i a n  regime. Thus was t h e  p o s s i b l e  f i r s t  a t t empt  a t  peace fu l  
s e t t l e m e n t  n u l l i f i e d .  
A t  t h e  same t ime wh i l e  Aus t in  wasat tempting t o  a r r ange  a 
meeting wi th  Cato,  S t .  L u c i a ' s  Prime M i n i s t e r  Compton began 
c a l l i n g  f o r  a meeting of  a l l  Caricom members. Tom Adams reques ted  
t h a t  such a meeting be  he ld  i n  Barbados, b u t  when P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
Chambers, of T r in idad ,  t h e  t hen  Chairman of t h e  Caricom Heads 
of Government conference ,  a r ranged  Chat meeting f o r  P o r t  of Spain  
on Saturday October 2 2 ,  Adams w a s  obviously  peeved, s i n c e  he 
would no longe r  be  a b l e  t o  dominate a c t i v i t i e s ,  and t h e  c e n t e r  
of a c t i v i t y  would s h i f t  from Barbados. Not on ly  d i d  he  r e f u s e  
t o  a t t e n d  t h i s  meeting,  b u t  on Fr iday  21, scheduled a cont inuous 
series of n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  culminat ing i n  an 0.E.C.S meeting he ld  
i n  Barbados, a non-member count ry ,  t h a t  evening.  
I t  was a t  t h e  Fr iday  evening meeting of t h e  O.E.C.S. t h a t  a  
formal d e c i s i o n  w a s  t aken  t o  invoke A r t i c l e  8 ,  paragraph 4 ,  
concerning t h e  use  of a  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  t o  r e s t o r e  peace t o  
Grenada and t o  i n v i t e  f r i e n d l y  s tates t o  p a r t i c i p a t e .  
Both l e g a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  0.E.C.S d e c i s i o n  has  
r a i s e d  a s  much q u e s t i o n s  a s  it has  provided answers. For 
i n s t a n c e ,  A r t i c l e  8 ,  paragraph 5 r e q u i r e s a l l  d e c i s i o n s  of t h a t  
body be unanimous. Not on ly  w a s  a  formal  v o t e  no t  t aken  a t  
t h a t  meeting,  b u t  more impor t an t ly ,  a l l  members d i d  n o t  p a r t i c i -  
p a t e .  Robert  P a s t o r  has  noted t h a t  on ly  fou r  of t h e  seven 
O.E.C.S. members supported c o l l e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n .  56  
Grenada, of cou r se ,  d i d  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t e  s i n c e  t h e  0.E.C.S 
r e fused  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  M i l i t a r y  Counci l .  Within a  few days 
of t h e  i nvas ion  though, t h e  O.E.C.S.  recognized Grenada's  
Governor General ,  S i r  Paul  Scoon a s  t h e  o f f i c i a l  head of govern- 
ment. 
F u r t h e r ,  A r t i c l e  8:4 pe rmi t s  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  
" e x t e r n a l  aggress ion ."  How could a member of an  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  e x t e r n a l  agg res s ion  a g a i n s t  f e l l ow m e m b e r s ?  The 
argument has  been made t h a t  t h e  presence  of  Cubans i n  Grenada, 
" e x t e r n a l i z e d "  Grenada 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  v i s -a -v i s  o t h e r  member 
s t a t e s .  57  That  argument, of course ,  accepted as f a c t ,  t h e  
numbers provided by t h e  United S t a t e s  concerning t h e  Cuban 
presence  i n  Grenada, which numbers, t h e  U.S. Adminis t ra t ion  
l a t e r  admi t ted ,  w a s  i n c o r r e c t .  And f u r t h e r ,  one must now 
s p e c u l a t e ,  does  n o t  t h e  presence  of hundreds of American 
personnel  i n  Grenada, i n  t h e  pos t - invas ion  pe r iod  f u r t h e r  
" e x t e r n a l i z e "  t h e  Grenadian s i t u a t i o n ?  
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The I n v i t a t i o n  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  
Formally, t h e  O.E.C.S.'s i n v i t a t i o n  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  
t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  invasion fo rce  was made immediately 
following t h e  O.E.C.S. meeting on Friday evening October 2 1 s t .  
This ,  however, was not  t h e  i n i t i a l  involvement of t h e  U.S. i n  
the  Grenada s i t u a t i o n .  Indeed, one week e a r l i e r ,  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  had p r i v a t e l y  approached Barbados concerning t h e  prospects  
f o r  rescuing Maurice Bishop from h i s  cap to r s .  58 Alan Romberg. 
spokesman f o r  t h e  U.S. S t a t e  Department l a t e r  claimed t h a t  
it was t h e  Caribbean s tates  t h a t  had approached t h e  U.S. on 
October 15th .  59 Further .  t h e  U .S. on October 20, had d ive r t ed  
some of i t s  naval t a sk  fo rces  on t h e  way t o  Lebanon, t o  t h e  
Caribbean region,  a day before  t h e  O.E.C.S. meeting, which 
formally i n v i t e d  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  The 
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  U.S. became, i n  one way o r  another ,  involved i n  
t h e  Grenada crisis, before  a formal i n v i t a t i o n  was made, ccm- 
? 
t r a d i c t s  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  of Secre tary  of S t a t e  Shul tz  t h a t  the  
U.S. did not  become involved u n t i l  October 2 0 ,  t h e  day a f t e r  
Bishop w a s  k i l l e d .  60 
I t  i s  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  before  t h e  0.E.C.S dec i s ion ,  Adams 
had i n  f a c t  i n i t i a t e d  d iscuss ions  with t h e  U.5, and B r i t a i n  
concerning t h e  prospects  f o r  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  H e  l a t e r  
admitted t h a t  d iscuss ions  took p lace  with var ious  High Commis- 
s ioner s  and ambassadors e a r l y  on Friday October 2 0 ,  6 1  
The ques t ion  a r i s e s ,  the re fo re :  Did t h e  U.S. pressure  t h e  
O.E.C.S. f o r  an i n v i t a t i o n  t o  be involved o r  d id  they. merely 
respond t o  a n  O.E.C.S.  i n v i t a t i o n ?  The New York T i m e s  r e p o r t e d  
on October 3 0 ,  t h a t  t h e  O.E.C.S. r e q u e s t  w a s  d r a f t e d  i n  
Washington and t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  Caribbean leaders hi^.^^ Another 
newspaper claimed 6 3  
"U.S. p l ans  f o r  i n t e rven ing  i n  Grenada 
w e r e  drawn up s e c r e t l y  i n  Washington t e n  
days b e f o r e  t h e  i nvas ion  w a s  launched." 
And t h i s  same source  cor robora ted  t h e  prev ious  s t a t emen t s  from 
t h e  N e w  York T i m e s ,  c la iming  t h a t  t h e  O.E.C.S.'s appea l  w a s  
a c t u a l l y  t r i g g e r e d  by an  o f f e r  from t h e  United S t a t e s .  I n  
e f f e c t ,  Washington's message was: 6 4  " I s s u e  an appea l  and we 
w i l l  respond." 
There i s  a l s o  t h e  myster ious  l e t te r  of Governor General  
Scoon t o  t h e  O.E.C.S. a sk ing  t h e  U.S. and Caribbean c o u n t r i e s  
t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Grenada. The U.S. has  claimed 
t h a t  t h i s  let ter  t o g e t h e r  w i th  t h e  O.E.C.S. i n v i t a t i o n  had 
provided s u f f i c i e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  involvement. This  
l e t t e r  w a s  supposedly s e n t  on Saturday October 22. Yet on t h e  
fo l lowing  day, U . K .  Deputy High Commissioner, David Montgomery, 
f l ew t o  Grenada and he ld  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  S i r  Pau l .  S i r  Paul  
a l s o  spoke, by te lephone ,  t o  t h e  Commonwealth S e c r e t a r i a t  on 
t h e  same day. I n  n e i t h e r  c a s e  d i d  he  r e q u e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .  I t  
was a f t e rwards  claimed t h a t  t h e  let ter  w a s  d r a f t e d  by t h e  United 
S t a t e s ,  t o  add l eg i t imacy  f o r  i t s  involvement, and s igned  by 
S i r  Pau l ,  a f t e r  h e  was taken  aboard t h e  U.S.S. Guam on Tuesday, 
October 25th.  65 
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In the early morning hours of October 25, over 1,900 U.S. 
Marines and Rangers invaded Grenada. The U.S. force eventually 
numbered over 6,000 accompanied by an assortment of naval forces, 
bombers and helicopter gunships. The U.S. force was supposedly 
part of a seven nation multinational force. After the U.S. 
forces had achieved its initial objectives some 300 Caribbean 
troops and policemen were flown to Grenada but did not engage 
in fighting. After three days of sporadic fighting, the official 
U.S. figure of those killed in action were U.S., 18; Cuba, 24; 
Grenada, 16. The Grenadian figures did not include the over 
20 killed when a U.S. aircraft accidentally bombed a Grenadian 
mental asylum. Officially, over 400 were wounded. Grenadian 
accounts placed Grenadian citizens dead at over 50; hundreds 
wounded; and millions of dollars of property lost. 
During the week of the U.S. invasion Americans only saw 
and read what the Reagan Administration wanted them to, through 
complete censorship by the Administration over events in Grenada. 
The footage shown on the national television was supplied by 
the U.S. military. All other information was provided by similar 
sources and the Administration. The effect was predictable. 
An overwhelming 85 percent of the population, in a scientific 
poll, supported the invasion. 
The U.S. Administration had reason to fear independent 
source of information. Media coverage of the Vietnam War had 
Americans into the streets in the 1960s to protest U.S. involve- 
ment. I t  w a s  t h i s  p r o t e s t  t h a t  influencedLyndon Johnson 
a g a i n s t  running f o r  t h e  pres idency  i n  1968. The U.S. would 
f a c e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  i n  one y e a r .  The e a r l y  impact of 
a  "media" p r e s i d e n t  had a l l  b u t  ended. Domest ical ly ,  i n f l a t i o n  
has  been curbed which f a c i l i t a t e d  bus ines s ,  b u t  unemployment 
remained high.  P o l l s  had shown about  4 4  p e r c e n t  of t h e  e l e c t o -  
r a t e  w i l l i n g  t o  suppor t  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan f o r  f o u r  more y e a r s .  
Then came t h e  B e i r u t  massacre.  This  could have been f o r  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan what t h e  I r a n  hos tage  c r i s i s  w a s  f o r  P r e s i d e n t  
Carter--a major ins t rument  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  d e f e a t .  I f  handled 
" a p p r o p r i a t e l y , "  r i d d i n g  Grenada of a  l e f t - l e a n i n g  regime could 
enormous p o l i t i c a l  rewards,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  meeting o t h e r  objec-  
t i v e s :  M r .  Reagan's obsess ion  w i t h  Grenada; t each  Cuba a  
l esson:  send a warning t o  Nicaragua; demonstra te  t o  t h e  U.S. 
p u b l i c  h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  con f ron t  Communism. To have maximum 
impact ,  however, c o n t r o l  over  in format ion  w a s  v i t a l .  And t h i s  
was n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach ieve .  By simply prevent ing  independent 
sou rces  of in format ion  from g e t t i n g  t o  Grenada t h e  Adminis t ra t ion  
could  monopolize c o n t r o l  over  a l l  in format ion .  A few Navy v e s s e l s  
and take-over o f  t h e  a i r p o r t s  e f f i c i e n t l y  achieved t h i s .  Fu r the r  
it w a s  important  t h a t  t h e  " f a c t s "  coming o u t  of  Grenada w e r e  i n  
accordance w i t h  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  provided by t h e  U.S. f o r  i t s  e n t r y .  
The L e g a l i t y  of U , S ,  ~ c t i ~ n  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan's f i r s t  o f f i c i . q l  degense o f  the. invqs ion  
i n  h i s  p u b l i c  s t a t e ~ n e n t  on October 25 ,  was: t o  p r o t e c t  innocent  
U.S. l i v e s  i n  Grenada; t o  f o r e s t a l l  f u r t h e r  chaos;  t o  a s s i s t  
i n  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  of l a w  and o r d e r .  La t e r  t h a t  day Sec re t a ry  
of S t a t e  Shu l t z  added t h e  f e a r  of hos tage  t a k i n g  and t h e  i n v i t a -  
t i o n  of t h e  O.E.C.S. s i n c e  " t h e  Caribbean i s  i n  ou r  neighborhood." 
I n  a n a t i o n a l  T.V. add re s s  two days l a t e r  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan 
f u r t h e r  claimed t h a t  U . S .  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  was a t  s t a k e  s i n c e  
Moscow and Cuba had conver ted Grenada i n t o  a colony and w e r e  
a s s i s t i n g  i n  promoting v io l ence  t h e r e .  H e  added very  c o l o r f u l l y ,  
and pu re ly  f o r  domestic consumption " t h e  nightmare of  ou r  
hos tages  i n  I r a n "  and h i s  r e s o l v e  t o  p reven t  a  r e p e t i t i o n  of 
t h a t  s i t u a t i o n .  The q u e s t i o n  remained: Were American arguments 
f o r  i nvas ion  l e g a l l y  d e f e n s i b l e ?  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  law recognizes  t h e  r i g h t  of a  s t a t e  t o  p r o t e c t  
i t s  c i t i z e n s  i n  ano the r  i f  t h e i r  l i v e s  a r e  t h rea t ened  and i f  t h e  
h o s t  government f a i l s  t o  p r o t e c t  them. Y e t  t h e  e x t e n t  of f o r c e  
employed must be on ly  s o  much as t o  r e scue  t h e s e  c i t i z e n s .  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan claimed t h a t  t h e  s t u d e n t s '  l i v e s  w e r e  t h r ea t ened ;  
t h a t  they had no way bf g e t t i n g  o u t  of  Grenada s i n c e  t h e  a i r p o r t  
was c lo sed ;  and t h a t  t h e  s t u d e n t s  were c a l l i n g  f o r  h e l p .  Much 
of t h e  f a c t s  l a t e r  known w e r e  t h a t  t h e  s t u d e n t s '  l i v e s  became 
t h r e a t e n e d  on ly  a f t e r  t h e  i nvas ion  had begun--simply by having 
b u l l e t s  f l y i n g  around them. I n  f a c t ,  one-half of  t h e  s t u d e n t  
body remained i n  Grenada, even though U . S .  c r a f t s  were w i l l i n g  
t o  e s c o r t  them o u t .  F u r t h e r ,  a s  t h e  Adminis t ra t ion  i t s e l f  l a t e r  
admi t ted ,  t h e  a i r p o r t  was a c t u a l l y  open a l l  of t h e  t i m e ,  t h u s  
s t u d e n t s  could  have l e f t  i f  they  had s o  d e s i r e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  very 
obvious,  t h a t  t h e  e x t e n t  of f o r c e  employed by t h e  U,S. was 
c l e a r l y  beyond t h a t  necessary t o  p r o t e c t s  i t s  c i t i z e n s .  
A broad l e g a l  q u e s t i o n  concerns  t h e  o v e r a l l  use  of f o r c e  
by t h e  U.S. With few and ve ry  l i m i t e d  excep t ions ,  f o r c e  i s  
formal ly  outlawed a s  an ins t rument  i n  t h e  conduct of i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  Numerous a r t i c l e s  i n  bo th  t h e  U . N .  Cha r t e r  
and i n  t h e  O.A.S. Ayreement, two of t h e  p e r t i n e n t  documents, 
no t  on ly  r e p u d i a t e  t h e  u s e  of  f o r c e  but! d e t a i l  i n  clear language 
t h e  r e s p e c t  f o r  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  of a s t a t e .  The U . N .  
pe rmi t s  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f  defense  i f  an  "armed 
a t t a c k "  occurs .  The O.E.C.S. has ,  however, argued,  a s  p rev ious ly  
d i scussed ,  t h a t  t h e  presence  of Cubans i n  Grenada "ex te rna l i zed"  
Grenada's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  o t h e r  O.E.C.S.  members, and presumably, 
a s  w e l l ,  provided grounds f o r  c l a i m s  of "p rospec t ive  armed a t t a c k "  
a g a i n s t  member s t a t e s .  A s  a consequence, t h e  O.E.C.S. might be 
moved t o  a rgue  on "pre-emptive s e l f -de fense"  grounds.  
Jeane Kirkpa t r i ck ,  U.S. Ambassador t o  t h e  U . N . ,  d i s a g r e e s  
w i th  t h e  view t h a t  p r e s e n t  norms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  conduct  
a b s o l u t e l y  out laws t h e  u se  o f  f o r c e  i n  t h e  conduct of i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  Speaking t o  t h e  U . N . ' s  S e c u r i t y  Council  on 
t h e  deba te  ove r  t h e  U . S .  i nvas ion  o f  Grenada she  argued: 66 
"The p r o h i b i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  u s e  of f o r c e  
i n  t h e  U . N .  Cha r t e r  a r e  c o n t e x t u a l ,  n o t  
a b s o l u t e .  They provide  ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  u s e  of f o r c e  a g a i n s t  f o r c e  i n  t h e  
p u r s u i t  of o t h e r  v a l u e s  a l s o  i n s c r i b e d  i n  
t h e  Cha r t e r . "  
This  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  law i s  i n  keeping wi th  t h e  p r e s e n t  
Admin i s t r a t i on ' s  p o l i c y  of viewing i t s  concept ion  of t h e  
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  as provid ing  i t s  own law and m o r a l i t y .  
One of the major bases for the U.S. invasion, is the 
Administration's claim of an invitation provided by the O.E.C.S. 
It has already been demonstrated that the O.E.C.S. violated its 
own established principle of unanimity provided for by Article 
8:5 of its Treaty. Further serious questions are raised over the 
fact that the Treaty requires "external aggression" on behalf of 
a state to warrant a military response by the O.E.C.S. But 
moreover, since the O.E.C.S. Treaty was never deposited at the 
U.N., was it in fact a binding document? And again, since the 
U.S. was not a party to the Treaty, could member states request 
a non-member to act on their behalf? While the O.E.C.S. Treaty 
does not appear to answer this last question in the affirmative, 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does permit individual and 
collective self-defense. But such is permitted only in the 
face of "armed attack." There is no way that the activities 
occurring in Greanda could have constituted "armed attack" 
against O.E.C.S. members, or against the United States. 
Finally, when President Reagan presented his first 
explanation claiming that the intervention was to "forestall 
further chaos" and to "restore law and order" he implied that 
the invasion was based on the principle of"h~manitarian inter- 
vention." Such intervention is legitimate in the eyes of 
international law. But for such to be invoked a total breakdown 
is required within the society accompanied by a total suppression 
of human rights; mass murder of civilians; repeated calls by 
the international community to desist; and a moral consensus 
that supports such intervention. This problem relates obviously 
to the degree of violence within a society. It is unlikely that 
the facts of the Grenada situation would therefore justify 
invasion on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. 
From all of the foregoing it is clear that there is very 
little, if any, legal justification for the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada. The political dimensions of the operation are somewhat 
more clear. 
Political Aspects of the U.S. Invasion 
The militarily successful U.S. invasion of Grenada appears 
to herald a new era in U.S. foreign policy. And even if the 
legal arguments by the Administration in support of the invasion 
are unconvincing, it is the political symbolism of that event 
that has significant and frightening implications for a peaceful 
world. One of the more painful lessons of this invasion must 
be that, in a swift and decisive stroke, albeit against an 
island of one hundred thousand people, the U.S. has overcome 
the political and psychological obstacles of the Vietnam 
experience. 
In the aftermath of the disastrous showing of the U.S. in 
Vietnam this country undoubtedly moved toward a posture of 
isolationism in world affairs. Thus, the U.S. played no official 
part in the Angola crisis and tacitly supported the overthrow 
of Somoza in Nicaragua. In between, the Shah's reign came to 
a swift and sudden end with the U.S. as a mere by-stander. But 
then came Grenada. 
The rationale for the invasion of Grenada cannot be 
found in the brutal death of Prime Minister Bishop and some of 
his Cabinet. Neither was the foundation possibly inthe mock 
invasion on the island of Vieques in August 1981. One apparent 
basis for the invasion may be in the ideas of U.S. foreign policy 
expressed by the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
in an article in Commentary 67 which catapulted her as a major 
architect of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy. In 
that article she argued for defense of the national interest at 
all cost; support for right wing pro-American dictatorships 
while squashing thoseof the left; and presented a view of the 
world as one of East/West confrontation, and implicitly, one 
in which the Third World becomes a mere object of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
Indeed, the present Administration has largely adopted the 
approach to international relations which views the world as 
one large game of dominoes. And thus from the post-Vietnam 
mood of neo-isolationism the major lesson of Grenada is that 
the U.S. must now be seen as a global unilateralist. And after 
a decade-long policy of withdrawal the invasion of Grenada clearly 
demonstrates the willingness of the U.S. to go-it-alone, regard- 
less of world opinion, and as significantly, of international 
law as well. 
One is obviously led to pose the question: How different 
then, is U.S. foreign policy from that of the Soviet Union, and 
could one really expect different standards of international 
behavior  from t h e  United S t a t e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when t h e  l a t t e r  
pe rce ives  i t s  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  t o  be  t h rea t ened .  The Brezhnev 
Doct r ine  enunc ia ted  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  U.S.S.R. had t h e  
r i g h t  t o  determine t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of governments 
w i t h i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  sphere  of i n f l u e n c e .  I n  t h a t  c o n t e x t ,  
then ,  t h e  U.S. i nvas ion  of Grenada i s  nothing more t h a n  a  
Reagan v e r s i o n  of t h e  Brezhnev Doct r ine ,  o the rwi se  termed t h e  
Monroe Doct r ine .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  however, t h i s  a c t i o n  w a s  under- 
t aken  i n  t h e  name of "defense  of democracy" and t h e  promotion of 
"freedomw--reminiscent  of t h e  S o v i e t  Union's  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  
i nvas ion  of Afghanis tan.  
But d i d  t h e  mic ro - s t a t e  Grenada t r u l y  t h r e a t e n  t h e  v i t a l  
i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  and w a s  Grenada a  s e c u r i t y  
t h r e a t  t o  t h e  U.S.? While t h e  world s t i l l  awaits t h e  proof 
concerning t h e  l a t t e r  - t h e  v i n t a g e  arms caches  and documentation 
of secret agreements be ing  mere excuses  of p roo f ,  i n  a c e r t a i n  
s ense  Grenada d i d  t h r e a t e n  t h e  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  U . S .  
Indeed,  M r .  Reagan i s  c o r r e c t  when he  s a i d  "we g o t  t h e r e  j u s t  
i n  t ime , "  b u t  n o t  f o r  t h e  reasons  he  p re sen ted .  
Other t han  t h e  se l f -proc la imed d e c l a r a t i o n  of "world 
policeman," t h e  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  U.S. l i e  i n  t h e  promotion 
of c a p i t a l i s m .  Indeed,  one may a rgue ,  t h e  former i s  pursued 
t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  l a t t e r .  To t h a t  e x t e n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  U.S. f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  Caribbean r eg ion  has  been p r i m a r i l y  
d i r e c t e d  toward t h e  promotion and p r o t e c t i o n  of i t s  economic 
i n t e r e s t s  t h e r e .  Grenada, under t h e  New Jewel Movement, 
p o s s i b l y  t h rea t ened  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  by commencing t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  
of an alternative economic system to capitalism, which was 
beginning to show results. Conversely, the U.S. showplaces 
for capitalism in the region: Puerto Rico since 1945, and 
Jamaica since 1980 are both failures. After forty years of 
Bootstrap, chaos in Puerto Rico is forestalled only by the 
largesse of the U.S. tax payer and unrestricted migration to 
the mainland. The Jamaican masses would probably agree that 
after four years under Mr. Seaga's leadership nothing has 
"trickled down" to them. At best their living conditions 
have stagnated during this period. The relative success of 
the Grenada model: a mixed system of private and public 
enterprise, could have provided a viable economic alternative 
for the Caribbean mini-states. But to the extent that such a 
system is essentially anti-capitalistic the U.S. could not 
permit it to be successful. The Caribbean has served historf- 
cally as a major and stable region for U.S. investments. The 
U.S. needed to protect such interests at any cost. 
If Grenada's economics were bold, its politics were even 
bolder. Located within the U.S. sphere of influence, it attempted 
to pursue an anti-U.S. foreign policy--a position only achieved 
by Cuba in this hemisphere. Moreover, the relationship between 
Bishop and Castro was very close. Recognizing that there were 
small but vocal leftist groups throughout the region, the U.S. 
State Department was fearful of others following the pattern 
that Bishop was attempting to establish. One such official 
said:68 "Think of the precedent it would set." And he 
cont inued:  
"We obviously  do n o t  l i k e  being p u t  i n  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  of t h e  heavy. We want t o  act  l i k e  
a mature,  r e s p o n s i b l e  world power. But 
h e r e ' s  a l i t t l e  count ry  say ing  i n s o l e n t  t h i n g s ,  
and we ' re  fo rced  t o  r ep ly . "  
There is  however, one f i n a l  i rony  of t h e  U . S .  i nvas ion  
of Grenada. The Bishop takeover  o f  a n  e l e c t e d  government i n  
t h e  Commonwealth Caribbean,  t h e  f i r s t  such i n c i d e n t  among t h o s e  
c o u n t r i e s ,  tended n o t  on ly  t o  a l i e n a t e  t h e  l a t t e r  from Grenada, 
b u t  more than  anything else served t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  r e s p e c t  
f o r  peace fu l  change. And indeed r a t h e r  t h a n  being a source  f o r  
" i n f e c t i o n "  of t h e  r eg ion ,  it w a s  viewed more a s  a n  " innocu la t ion"  
a g a i n s t  Marx is t  p o l i c i e s .  The d e a t h  of Bishop on ly  served t o  
f u r t h e r  a l i e n a t e  t h e  r eg ion  a g a i n s t  Grenada, and indeed a g a i n s t  
Marxism i n  g e n e r a l .  The U.S. i nvas ion  of Grenada, though, has  
served t o  i n c r e a s e  sympathy f o r  t h a t  count ry  and among t h e  
l a r g e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  r eg ion  Barbados and Jamaica s t and  a lone  
i n  suppor t  f o r  U.S. a c t i o n .  On t h e  one hand t h e  U . S .  demon- 
s t r a t e d  i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  f l a g r a n t l y  v i o l a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
agreements i nc lud ing  t h e  U . N .  Cha r t e r  and t h e  O.A.S. Agreements, 
and t o  bend t h e  O.E.C.S. Agreement, t o  s u i t  i t s  own purposes .  
On t h e  o the r ,  t h e  excesses  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  i nvas ion ,  i nc lud ing  
t h e  c rude  t r ea tmen t  of Grenadian prisoners--keeping them i n  boxes 
f o r  days ,  t h e  parad ing  i n  cha ins  of Coard and Aus t in  i n  t h e  s t r e e t s  
of S t .  Georges, and t h e  massive and c rude  techniques  of psycho- 
l o g i c a l  war fa re  have a l t o g e t h e r  not  enhanced t h e  U.S. s t a t u s  i n  
t h e  r eg ion .  Thus f o r  y e t  ano ther  occas ion ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  of U.S. 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  have been t h e  p r e c i s e  o p p o s i t e  of i t s  s t a t e d  
i n t e n t i o n s .  
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